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An Introduction 
 
 
On November 7, 2000, two million United States citizens cast their ballots 
without voting for president, not by choice, but by federal mandate. This is tradition. 
Since 1917, when residents of Puerto Rico were granted United States citizenship, they 
have been denied the right to vote for president. As U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans have 
been denied any form of voting representation in the federal government: no voting 
congressperson or senator, and no electoral votes for president. Still, citizens continually 
exercise their right to vote in local elections at higher frequency than any state of the 
union.1 The right to vote in federal elections is just one aspect of what has been deemed 
the Puerto Rican question. 
                                                 
1
 Manuel Alvarez Rivera. Elecciones en Puerto Rico. (2007) www.electionspuertorico.org. and David 
Lublin and D. Stephen Voss. Federal Elections Project. Washington, D.C. and Lexington, KY : American 
University and University of Kentucky. 2001. Although the official Puerto Rican voter turnout for 2000 
(82.2 percent) is inflated, the island persistently boasts higher voter turnout than any state in the union 
based on a comparison of ballots cast versus voting-aged population. Using Census 2000 data of people 
over the age of 18 residing in Puerto Rico, an estimated 74.1 percent of the voting-aged population voted in 
2000. This compares to the highest state estimate for the 2000 election of 68.75 percent for Minnesota. 
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What is Puerto Rico’s political status with relation to the United States and what 
should it be? This question has been studied by scholars from various academic 
disciplines, as well as politicians and pundits. Works tackling the topic have been 
published in student newspapers, scholarly journals, multi-volume compilations of 
academic research, and the Congressional Record of the United States Congress. 
However, the Puerto Rican question is not the focus of my research. Rather, I investigate 
how the status question has been framed in the past and what framework of analysis best 
represents Puerto Rican views. The vast majority of works about status, regardless of 
author, follow one of two theoretical frameworks: the first emphasizes an economic, cost-
benefit analysis, while the second focuses on an ideological, nationalism-based 
interpretation of political status. While these two frameworks offer unique insights into 
the status debates generally, neither can fully account for the findings of the two 
“Plebiscites on Status” held on the island in the 1990s. Grounded in these explicit 
demonstrations of national sentiment as benchmarks, I utilize and expand upon George 
Lakoff’s Moral Politics to identify the Puerto Rican political status debate as a moral 
issue which incorporates and supersedes frameworks based solely on economics or 
ideology. 
What is “political status”? Abstractly, the question asks for a simple legal 
definition. Political status refers to the official, legal relationship between two governing 
entities, i.e. the legal relationship between the governments of Puerto Rico and of the 
United States of America. This concrete example, however, exemplifies the difficulty in 
answering such a basic question in a real world context. Although continually contested, 
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Puerto Rico’s official political status has remained the same since 1917. A White House 
report published in December, 2005, supports this view. The “Report by the President’s 
Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status,” recognizes that the island is and has been an 
“organized, unincorporated territory” since the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917.2 In effect, 
this status means that residents of Puerto Rico are to remain U.S. citizens. However, 
under the U.S. Constitution, territories are not sovereign entities and all power to govern 
them is held by the federal government. Furthermore, “unincorporated” status leaves 
Puerto Rico in obscurity in the federal system, as only “organized, incorporated 
territories” may become full fledged states, incorporated as equals with voting 
representation in the federal government.  
Although the report was not signed by President George W. Bush, Puerto Rico’s 
status as an “organized, unincorporated territory” has been the federal government’s 
status quo for nearly a century. Conjuring connotations of colonialism, exploitation and 
repression, this status was immediately rejected by the governor of Puerto Rico, Aníbal 
Acevedo Víla. In an open letter to the public, Governor Acevedo Víla renounced the 
report as “the most distorted, factually and legally wrong declaration on Puerto Rico ever 
produced.”3 This interaction reflects the heated debate over Puerto Rico’s political status 
and does not begin to scratch the surface of the century-old struggle to come to consensus 
about the island’s future. 
                                                 
2
 Barrales, Ruben and Kevin Marshall, Gilbert Gonzalez, Elizabeth Dial, Frank Jimenez, Kathleen Leos, 
Theresa Speake Jack Kalavritinos, Joshua Filler, Loretta Greene, David P. Smith, Veronica Vargas 
Stidvent, Portia Palmer, David Kelly, Tony Fratto, and William McLemore. Report by the President’s Task 
Force on Puerto Rico’s Status. December 2005. http://charma.uprm.edu/~angel/Puerto_Rico/reporte_status 
. pdf 3. 
3
 Governor Aníbal Acevedo Vilá. “Public Letter.” San Juan, Puerto Rico: La Fortaleza. 24 January 2006. 
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In order to establish consensus on the island regarding the status question, the 
government of Puerto Rico held two “Plebiscites on Status” in the 1990s. In 1993 and 
1998 residents cast ballots for their preferred status option. During the two plebiscites, 
U.S. citizens with permanent residency in Puerto Rico chose from various options what 
they viewed to be the best political status for Puerto Rico with relation to the United 
States. After all the ballots were counted, some observers believed Puerto Ricans 
supported the “status quo.”4 While in 1993 a plurality of voters supported a slightly 
altered configuration of the current “Commonwealth” status, none of the three options on 
the ballot received an outright majority. In 1998, a majority of voters rejected all four of 
the given status options by voting for “None of the above.” An in-depth description of the 
two plebiscites is included in Chapter 1.  
Before exploring the plebiscites, it is crucial to understand the importance of 
“political status.” As an abstract legal definition, political status has everyday 
implications for those who live in Puerto Rico. The repercussions of political status are 
entangled within the greater debate over the future of the island and affect nearly every 
aspect of life on it. From the language spoken in public schools and in the halls of 
government, to zoning regulations and tax benefits, from the way people get to work in 
the booming metropolitan capitol, San Juan, to expressions of Puerto Rican pride in 
international competitions like the Olympics and Miss Universe Pageant, from questions 
of citizenship and the creation of distinct political parties, to systematic 
                                                 
4
 “Puerto Rico.” CIA World Factbook. 2007. https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/print/rq.html 
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disenfranchisement on the federal level, political status perpetually defines the island and 
the people who reside in it. 
Because of the importance political status holds for Puerto Rico and its residents, 
politicians, scholars, and pundits have written volumes discussing different options and 
the means of achieving them. All of the options invoke one of three thematic ideologies: 
independence, assimilation (federal statehood), or autonomy (commonwealth status with5 
the U.S. federal system). The finer details of each ideology have changed over time and 
will be discussed throughout this work in their respective historical contexts. 
These abstract ideologies (independence, assimilation, and autonomy) define 
politics in Puerto Rico. Because the status question is so pervasive, the three thematic 
categories are the defining planks of political parties on the island. The Popular 
Democratic Party (PPD or Partido Popular Democrático) crafted the current 
Commonwealth government and has carried the torch of autonomous status with relation 
to the United States for 60 years. The New Progressive Party (PNP or Partido Nuevo 
Progresista) promotes a version of assimilation and has continually demonstrated the 
popularity of federal statehood after the party won the governorship in 1968. As its name 
suggests, the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP or Partido Independentista 
Puertorriqueño) advocates for independence from the United States. While the PPD and 
the PNP dominate politics in Puerto Rico, consistently garnering over 90 percent of the 
                                                 
5
 Even the preposition used to relate commonwealth status to the U.S. is questioned. Does “with” or 
“within,” imply “under” the federal government? Commonwealth advocates traditionally have promoted a 
bilateral compact with the United States, though many question the validity of a bilateral compact between 
a nation-state and a non-state entity. 
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vote between the two parties in island wide elections,6 the PIP also retains “major party” 
status. All three parties receive public funding for their political campaigns and have a 
strong presence on the island. Even if the PIP remains only mildly popular at the ballot 
box, its opposition to statehood and commonwealth through grassroots protest and fiery 
rhetoric has kept alive the hope for an independent Puerto Rican republic. 
The three major parties reflect the historical division that has organized politics in 
Puerto Rico; people are divided by the ideologies of status. Unlike in the United States 
(Figure 1.1), the parties do not reflect a political spectrum delineating liberal-versus-
conservative, or ideologies of left-versus-right. While the Democratic and Republican 
parties have a small base of supporters and each holds a presidential primary on the 
island, neither party participates in mainstream electoral politics.7 
 
Rather, citizens have assembled themselves in a non-linear triangle of independence-
versus-statehood-versus-commonwealth (Figure 1.2). While some may argue that the 
three status themes create a linear progression from federal statehood to independence, 
with Commonwealth somewhere between the two, this is a gross oversimplification of 
                                                 
6
 Manuel Alvarez Rivera, interview by author, tape recording, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, 5 June 2006. 
7
 Though they caucus with either the Democratic or Republican Party, Puerto Rico’s non-voting member of 
congress runs as a member of one of the Puerto Rican political parties.  
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the ideologies behind status and is not as accurate a model of political ideology in Puerto 
Rico as a non-linear triangle. In practice, each ideological corner does not carry the same 
weight; the independence party is rarely victorious in electoral politics. Many politicians 
and scholars, including PIP party members, agree that supporters of independence have, 
at times, voted with the PPD as a vote in opposition to statehood.8 Such votes are then 
seen as practical and not strictly ideological. Thus, the weight and strategy of a specific 
vote does not affect the ideological model.  
The non-linear triangle model is crucial when analyzing Puerto Rican politics. 
The unique party divisions highlight the importance of the Puerto Rican question in 
political life. Still, it does not place the island outside of typical frameworks used to 
examine politics. Based on my research I conclude that two theoretical frameworks are 
deployed when analyzing Puerto Rican political structure and thus, when tackling the 
Puerto Rican question. 
Political status is studied either through an economic framework or through a 
nationalist framework. In this thesis, I explore the two frameworks and expound upon 
their implications for political discourse by analyzing scholarly literature, partisan 
narratives, and congressional reports. I also draw upon personal interviews I conducted in 
the spring of 2006 with senators from each of the three main political parties and one of 
the Puerto Rican Electoral Commission’s independent observers of the 1998 plebiscite on 
status. From these sources, I identify the two dominant theoretical frameworks employed 
to interpret the status question. I then examine the applicability of the economic and 
                                                 
8
 Senator Maria de Lourdes Santiago Negrón, interview by author, tape recording,  San Juan, Puerto Rico, 9 
June 2006. 
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nationalist frameworks by emphasizing the importance of the two plebiscites on status 
held in the 1990s as a political reality that must be explained by any relevant framework. 
Furthermore, I offer a new framework through which to view the Puerto Rican question 
by expanding on George Lakoff’s Moral Politics. 
It is important to note that none of the theoretical frameworks conclusively 
answers the Puerto Rican question, including the moral framework I expound upon later 
in this thesis. Rather, the theoretical frameworks offer a perspective on the debate. While 
the frameworks may suggest a specific status option (as will be shown in Chapters 2 and 
3), I argue that a new, more neutral and therefore more inclusive framework offers a 
better perspective on the debate. Furthermore, the moral framework of status 
acknowledges morality as a crucial aspect of the debate that is often neglected or 
relegated to fringe movements supporting independence. The moral framework is more 
adequate than the economic or nationalist frameworks. Recognizing and actually 
stressing the morality of status better represents sentiments expressed from all corners of 
the Puerto Rican political triangle. 
In Chapter 2, I explore the economic framework frequently used to shape the 
status debate and guide adherents of the economic model toward statehood. Drawing on 
secondary research and primary government documents, I illustrate the cost-benefit 
“balance sheet” often used by pundits and policymakers in attempts to unfurl the status 
debate. In this analysis I emphasize the importance of both economic and non-economic 
issues including taxation and subsidies, trade relations, and federal payment transfers 
(welfare), as well as cultural dimensions of status including the income/standard of living 
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disparity between Puerto Rico and the U.S., language differences, and each entity’s 
distinct history. 
While economic, cost-benefit analyses are valuable tools, they fail to fully capture 
socio-cultural aspects of the status debate. Chapter 3 shifts focus from an economic 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each status option, emphasizing 
statehood, to investigate theories of nationalism, which traditionally promoted 
independence. Much has been written about whether Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans 
themselves comprise a “nation.” Various theories of nationalism have been applied to the 
political and social realities people on the island face. In this chapter I evaluate the 
different theories of nationalism, focusing on Paul R. Brass’ vision of nationalism as 
“elite competition” as well as James M. Blaut’s Marxist theory of Puerto Rican 
nationalisms to locate and define the Puerto Rican nation. Unlike many nationalism 
scholars, I emphasize the importance of distinctly Puerto Rican nationalisms for both 
commonwealth (the PPD) and statehood advocates (the PNP). I then extrapolate the 
relevancy of these theories of nationalism as they apply to the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites 
on status. 
After demonstrating shortcomings of the economic and nationalist analyses 
relevant to the Puerto Rican case, emphasizing each framework’s inability to 
accommodate the breadth of the Puerto Rican question, I recognize a new framework to 
define the status debate. In Chapter 4, I apply George Lakoff’s Moral Politics to the issue 
of status in order to explain the plebiscites of the 1990s within the greater debate. I 
emphasize Lakoff’s foundational metaphor of “nation as family” to translate U.S. moral 
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politics to Puerto Rico. I argue that identifying the status debate in the realm of moral 
issues better accommodates all aspects of Puerto Rican political status, including both 
those that have been studied at length (economic and ideological analyses) and those 
aspects which have been ignored by traditional scholarship (moral).  
Before delving into the various frameworks of political status it is important to 
contextualize status historically in order to understand the details of each thematic option 
and how it has been presented to the people of Puerto Rico. For this purpose a brief 
history of Puerto Rico with special emphasis on the island’s political status is included in 
Chapter 1. Likewise, the specifics of each option will be outlined later in Chapter 1. The 
presentation of the options to the Puerto Rican public will be discussed throughout this 
work.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: A Brief History of Puerto Rico 
 
 
The following is a relatively sparse but informative recounting of the historical 
trajectory of Puerto Rican political status, beginning with the European colonization of 
the island. This account is far from comprehensive and is not intended to be. Rather, it 
offers a historical setting for and proposes some roots of the current Puerto Rican status 
question. Specifically, I locate in antiquity each of the three status ideologies that 
currently define Puerto Rican politics. Identifying the historical creation of each of these 
options will demonstrate that both the Puerto Rican question and its various answers are 
by no means new. After tracing the antecedents of statehood, independence and 
commonwealth in Puerto Rico, I outline the current tenets of each option as identified 
during the campaigns for the Plebiscites on Status held in 1993 and 1998. Throughout 
this thoroughly brief history, I highlight various anecdotes and moments in history that 
have, and continue to greatly affect the current debate. 
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The history of Puerto Rico is long in terms of its interactions with European 
colonizers. The island was “discovered” by Christopher Columbus 1493, a distinction the 
United States does not hold. However, this long, “modern” history can be broken down 
quite easily into three distinct epochs. The first two epochs are distinguished by the 
imperial power that colonized the island, namely: Spain and the United States of 
America. The third epoch presented is discernable primarily in rhetoric regarding status, 
proclaiming the “decolonization” of Puerto Rico. 
 
The Spanish Epoch and Transitional Period 
 Spain’s rule over Puerto Rico from 1508, when they first permanently settled the 
island, until the downfall of the Spanish empire in 1898 was perfect neither by Spanish 
nor Puerto Rican standards.1 Throughout its domination of the island, Spain defended its 
interests in Puerto Rico against internal and external threats. As a final plea for solidarity 
with the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the crown attempted to acquire support by granting 
the islanders autonomy, but to no avail. Although Imperial Spain’s domination of Puerto 
Rico lasted nearly four centuries, the years were marred by numerous economic and 
social problems, leading to social protests, civil unrest and the first posing of the status 
question. 
 With the death of prominent indigenous leader Cacique Agueybana in 1511 and 
the Taíno revolt that ensued, Spain struggled early to gain complete control of its 
possession in the Caribbean. The indigenous rebellion of 1511 was suppressed as the 
                                                 
1
 Nelson Hernández, “Desarrollo de la nación de Puerto Rico” (lecture, La Universidad del Sagrado 
Corazón, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1 February 2006). 
  
 
13 
 
 
 
surviving Taínos fled to the mountains of central Puerto Rico, leaving Spain unfettered 
control of the Puerto Rican coastal plains. Nationalism scholar James Blaut cites 1511 as 
the last year Puerto Rico can be considered an independent, sovereign territory.2 
 Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain slowly developed Puerto Rico’s 
economy by emphasizing the island’s sugar and ginger exports. The economic 
development of Puerto Rico necessarily increased the population on the island, including 
new migrants from Spain, slaves from Africa, and native born Puerto Ricans. Still, every 
aspect of life on Puerto Rico was mandated by the Spanish Crown or its appointed 
Spanish Governor; Spaniards born in Puerto Rico were systematically denied roles in the 
local government. From 1508 through 1898, the appointed military and civilian 
governors implemented Spain’s oppressive taxation of Puerto Rican goods and enforced 
laws prohibiting Puerto Rico from trading with any location other than the metropolis. 
 As the island’s economy grew, so did the dissatisfaction of native born Puerto 
Ricans. Numerous revolts against Spanish imperial authority resulted in brutal repression, 
most notably the Cry of Lares3 in 1868. During this revolt, plantation owners armed their 
slaves and captured the small town of Lares in Southwest Puerto Rico, declaring the 
island an independent republic. When revolutionaries attempted to seize a neighboring 
town the next day, nearly all were killed, or captured and later put to death. Though other 
revolts took place prior to September 23, 1868, the Cry of Lares is recognized as the most 
influential early independence movement and is still celebrated today. 
                                                 
2
 James M. Blaut and Loída Figueroa. Aspectos de la cuestión nacional en Puerto Rico. Editorial Claridad: 
San Juan. 1988. p. 7. 
3
 Known in Spanish as“el grito de Lares” 
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 The first political parties were established in Puerto Rico in 1870, only two years 
after the Cry of Lares. Still prohibited from the highest levels of government, Puerto 
Ricans were allowed to join Spaniards in a congressional body that advised the governor. 
Adherents of the Conservative Party were known as incondicionales (unconditionals) for 
their unconditional support of the Spanish Crown. A few months after the Conservative 
Party was founded, the Liberal Reformist Party arose and was comprised of asimilistas 
(assimilationists). Their stated goal was to become a new Spanish province in order to be 
represented in the Spanish Court. By 1887, however, the Liberal Reformist Party had 
split in two: those who wanted the island to become a Spanish province, and the 
autonomistas (Autonomist Party) who wanted Puerto Rico to become a semi-
autonomous, self-governing entity under Spanish sovereignty. Both factions of the party 
were violently repressed by the Puerto Rican government led by the Conservative Party 
as well as by the Spanish military. 
 In practice, Spain violently opposed any political influence from within the island, 
a precursor to Puerto Rico’s future colonizer—the United States of America. However, 
on the eve of the U.S.-Spanish War, Imperial Spain changed its stance toward the 
autonomists. In 1897, Luis Muñoz Rivera4 of the Autonomist Party signed a pact with the 
monarchy of Spain granting the island self-government and a degree of autonomy never 
before seen in the Spanish Colonies. However, due to the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico in 
1898, the autonomous government of Puerto Rico never actually governed the island.5 
 
                                                 
4
 Luis Muñoz Rivera was the father of Luis Muñoz Marín, who also redefined Puerto Rican political status. 
5
 Nelson Hernández, “Desarrollo de la nación de Puerto Rico” (lecture, La Universidad del Sagrado 
Corazón, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1 May 2006). 
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The U.S. Epoch 
 The overarching themes of exclusion and repression from the Spanish Epoch 
continued in Puerto Rico during the U.S. Epoch. After the fall of the Spanish military 
presence in Puerto Rico in 1898, the United States dominated the island economically, 
politically and militarily, in varying degrees up to the present day. For the purpose of 
simplicity however, I refer to the U.S. Epoch as the time between the fall of Spanish 
domination in 1898 and the creation of the current Commonwealth Constitution of Puerto 
Rico, ratified by the U.S. Congress, the government of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans via 
referendum in 1952 as the “Estado Libre Asociado” (“Commonwealth”). While some 
scholars argue that Puerto Rico’s political status did not fundamentally change after the 
ratification of the new constitution,6  the change in rhetoric surrounding the island’s 
political status does delineate a new era. 
 The U.S. Epoch, like the Spanish before it, was comprised of a near-constant 
battle to define a “mutually acceptable” formulation of status between colonizer and 
colonized. Politicians debated the same status options that were discussed under the 
Spanish Crown: assimilation (federal statehood), independence, and autonomy. At the 
same time, the grassroots Puerto Rican independence movement was violently repressed 
by U.S. military and intelligence agencies.7 Furthermore, the movement for autonomy 
was not popularized until the 1940’s, leaving statehood as the most prominently debated 
status option for nearly 40 years.  
                                                 
6
 Including Edwin and Edgardo Meléndez, James M. Blaut and the U.S. Federal government, among others 
7
 Nelson Hernández, “Desarrollo de la nación de Puerto Rico” (lecture, La Universidad del Sagrado 
Corazón, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 17 April 2006). And Marie Antoinette Merrill Ramirez. The Other Side of 
Colonialism: COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico in the 1960’s. The University of Texas at Austin. 1990. 
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Still, all three status options were recognizable during the early 20th century. The 
battle between these three conceptions of Puerto Rican political status was shaped by a 
few key occurrences. I will briefly recount the debates on citizenship, self-government, 
official language and legal political status from the U.S. Epoch that combine to provide a 
basic foundation for the current status debacle. 
Beginning in 1900, Puerto Ricans became citizens of Puerto Rico via the Foraker 
Act (Organic Act of 1900), under which Puerto Rico persisted as a colony subject to the 
authority of the federal government. While the Foraker Law afforded Puerto Ricans their 
first self-elected legislature, the government was still headed by a U.S. Citizen appointed 
by the U.S. President. Under this law, English and Spanish were both recognized as 
official languages of the island and its government. Translation between the two 
languages was mandated to foster mutual understanding when deemed necessary.  
The Foraker Law was greatly modified by the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917. This 
law continued Puerto Rico’s status as a political entity under the jurisdiction of the 
federal government, but afforded Puerto Ricans more rights. Most notably, the act gave 
Puerto Ricans “statutory” citizenship,8 granting Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship in lieu of 
Puerto Rican citizenship. However, U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans was and continues 
to be based on the will of congress and is not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. While 
the Jones-Shafroth Act awarded Puerto Rico new political rights and more governmental 
autonomy than the Foraker Act of 1900, it instituted a policy shift regarding the official 
language of the island. The law recognized English as the only official language of 
                                                 
8
 “Statutory citizenship” is a phrase coined by the PNP in the late 1980’s, used to emphasize that Puerto 
Rican’s U.S. citizenship is not guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, but is granted by Congress—a valid 
legal distinction. Statutory citizenship is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
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Puerto Rico. Likewise, the act unofficially recognized Puerto Rico as a colony of the 
United States by identifying the island as an “organized, unincorporated territory.” This 
legal status put the island on a path away from statehood and set the course of Puerto 
Rican political status for the next 30 years.9  
The reasons behind the creation and granting of “unincorporated” status are 
complex and worthy of study. However, such an investigation is not the goal of this paper 
or this brief history. Rather, it is noteworthy that the political trajectory of the island can 
be summed up in one word: unincorporated. In 1948 Puerto Ricans were allowed to elect 
the governor by popular vote for the first time. They elected Luis Muñoz Marín, who led 
his party, the newly founded Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) in crafting a new form 
of government for the island. 
 
The New State of Puerto Rico 
The repression of those in favor of independence and Puerto Rico’s status as an 
“organized, unincorporated territory” were the two crucial factors that led to the creation 
of an ambiguous new status formula. The new commonwealth status deviated from 
complete sovereignty and the traditional path toward statehood. The Commonwealth 
Constitution10 was crafted primarily by Luis Muñoz Marín as an answer to Puerto Rico’s 
then decades old status question. Commonwealth status was approved by the U.S. 
                                                 
9
 By naming Puerto Rico an “organized, unincorporated territory,” congress clearly defined that Puerto 
Rico was not on a path toward statehood. Historically, “organized” status implied that Congress has 
allowed the territory self-government. “Unincorporated” status has meant only that a territory is not on the 
path to statehood. After the U.S.-Spanish War, Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines were designated as 
“unincorporated,” which facilitated the secession of the later two territories. 
10
 “Constitución del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico” 
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Congress in 1952 and received nearly 82 percent of ballots cast in Puerto Rico during a 
yes-or-no ratification referendum later that year.11  Since its inception, however, Puerto 
Rico’s commonwealth status has been questioned repeatedly from within the island. 
The new status accepted that absolute sovereignty over the island’s affairs lay in 
the hands of the federal government but envisioned Puerto Rico as an autonomous region, 
self-governed by a popularly elected government. As before, permanent residents of 
Puerto Rico would retain U.S. citizenship, be eligible for the draft, and would receive no 
vote in federal government. Like a state however, the government of Puerto Rico would 
have the power to regulate internal affairs on the island and levy taxes; yet, it would not 
have the authority to sign treaties and would defer to the federal government in matters of 
foreign relations. However, unlike a state, Puerto Ricans would not pay federal income 
taxes and would not be equally eligible for some federal benefits like federal housing 
assistance, and education and health care financing programs.12 This autonomous status 
has been further defined over the last 54 years by federal statutes, which have created 
economic and socio-political advantages and disadvantages for U.S. citizens living in 
Puerto Rico.  
 
Questioning and Reinforcing the New State: The Plebiscite Era 
After commonwealth was implemented in 1952, the status debate did not end. The 
father of the Commonwealth Constitution, Governor Muñoz Marín, accepted that 
commonwealth was not the final solution to the Puerto Rican status question. Rather 
                                                 
11
 Alvarez Rivera. Elecciones en Puerto Rico. 
12
 Puerto Rico: Fiscal Relations with the Federal Government and Economic Trends during the Phaseout 
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Muñoz Marín viewed commonwealth as a temporary solution to be revisited later. During 
his 16 years as governor of Puerto Rico from 1948-1964, Muñoz Marín practiced the 
belief that the commonwealth government should be left alone while Puerto Rico focused 
on economic development.13 
Despite this desire, in 1967 the commonwealth government held the first island-
wide plebiscite on status. All eligible14 voters were given the opportunity to vote for one 
of the three status formulas on the ballot. While the plebiscite yielded an incredible 60.4 
percent of the vote in favor of commonwealth status as compared to the 39 percent of 
voters in favor of Statehood, these margins are almost universally deemed unreliable. 
There was an organized effort by those in favor of Puerto Rican independence to boycott 
the plebiscite, believing that they would not receive fair treatment in the electoral 
process. Likewise, a faction of statehood advocates also boycotted the plebiscite. For 
these and other reasons, the plebiscite itself is widely viewed as invalid. 
[The] referendum held in 1967—which affirmed the present common-
wealth status—was tainted by blatant interference by United States 
intelligence agencies documented and denounced as ‘hanky-panky’ in a 
White House memorandum issued during the Carter administration.15 
 
Though the results of this plebiscite are inconclusive, a new political party was born in 
the process. When, in 1966 PPD Governor Roberto Sánchez Vilella announced that a 
plebiscite was to be held the following year, the leader of the minority party, the 
Republican Statehood Party (PER or Partido Estadista Republicano) announced his plan 
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to boycott the vote alongside (but certainly not “with”) the PIP. When the party decided 
to support a boycott at a PER convention in January, 1967, a contingent of prominent 
pro-statehood politicos left the party to found a new pro-statehood party, the PNP 
(Partido Nuevo Progresista).16 The PER waned to irrelevance after the alleged failure of 
statehood in the 1967 plebiscite. As the dominant statehood party, the PNP thwarted the 
PPD (pro-commonwealth party) for the first time in a gubernatorial race since the 
governorship became popularly elected post in 1948. In 1968 the PNP gubernatorial 
candidate, Luis A. Ferré, won with a plurality of 43.6 percent of votes cast.17 
The end of PPD electoral dominance in 1968 suggested a new era in Puerto Rican 
politics and demonstrated what many already believed: not all Puerto Ricans were 
satisfied with commonwealth status. While the Commonwealth Constitution was 
supported in the 1952 referendum by over 80 percent of votes cast, twenty years of 
governing by the same party had taken its toll on the popularity of the Commonwealth. 
Although the PPD reclaimed the governorship in 1972, verifying Puerto Rico had 
become a multi-party democracy, the status question resurged as a valid topic of debate. 
While advocates of independence (including the PIP and other, more radical 
organizations), were still harassed and persecuted by local and federal authorities, 
statehood became a viable option for the first time in the minds of average Puerto Ricans. 
During the next twenty years the governorship changed parties three times, when 
in 1988 commonwealth advocate Rafael Hernández Colón was elected to a third term as 
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governor.18 After his reelection in November, 1988, he announced that he would pursue 
the solidification of Puerto Rican political status via a new plebiscite that he hoped would 
be supported by the federal government. This was a drastic and unexpected move by the 
leader of the PPD party, which stunned prominent party insiders.19  
Between 1989 and 1991, Governor Hernández Colón led his at times fractured, 
party into battle in Washington D.C. to obtain congressional support for a new plebiscite 
on status in Puerto Rico. Just as his efforts seemed to be coming to fruition in the form of 
Senate Bill #244, Colón received a stunning blow. Senate Bill #244 failed to pass the 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee on February 27, 1991, where it received a ten-
to-ten tie vote.20 With the bill essentially killed in committee, Governor Hernández Colón 
attempted to garner support for a new plebiscite from within Puerto Rico by offering a 
referendum on “Democratic Rights.” This constitutional amendment would guarantee 
Puerto Ricans the right to democratically determine their political status with relation to 
the United States by voting for whichever status option they preferred, and that any 
majority-winning status option would be supported by the government. Although this 
referendum was passed by the PPD dominated Puerto Rican legislature, voters soundly 
rejected this amendment by over 100,000 votes.21 Even before the referendum was voted 
upon, Governor Hernández Colón took a very unpopular stance, which many believed 
strongly influenced the amendment referendum. On April 5, 1991, Colón signed a bill 
recognizing Spanish as the only official language of Puerto Rico, rebuffing a precedent 
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set in 1902 with the “Spanish Law.” Admittedly, the 1902 law had been reinterpreted at 
various times prior to 1991. However, declaring Spanish to be the only official language 
of Puerto Rico enraged statehood supporters and provoked many Puerto Ricans to 
question the PPD’s desire to continue its connection with the United States. 
These failures by the pro-commonwealth party set the stage for what would be the 
worst electoral defeat for the party since its inception. In 1992, the PNP won the 
governorship as well as the statutorily-limited majority of seats possible in the Puerto 
Rican legislature. With this mandate, the new leader of the PNP, Dr. Pedro Roselló 
reevaluated the progress Congress had made with regard to the plebiscite on status in 
1991, and announced that he would support legislation to hold a new plebiscite on status. 
This plebiscite would be based primarily on the status options Congress had discussed 
from 1989 to 1991 and would be held in November, 1993. This would become the first 
plebiscite on status to be recognized as free and fair for the various status formulations.22 
Governor Roselló believed that the political winds would continue in the PNP’s favor and 
that such sentiment would translate into votes for statehood in 1993. 
During the campaign for the plebiscite, which was run much like an electoral 
campaign for a candidate, the PNP had an obvious advantage. After the PPD’s poor 
showing in the 1992 elections, former Governor Hernández Colón stepped aside as party 
president, which created a power vacuum in the party and a lack of leadership for the 
plebiscite. With four prominent politicos announcing their intent to become party 
president, the PPD had the potential to split into various factions. Instead, the four 
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candidates had the foresight to set aside their individual political ambitions and focus on 
the plebiscite itself, naming then Vice-president Miguel Hernández Agosto as acting 
president until after the plebiscite.23 
In spite of supported party leadership, the PPD was still at a disadvantage 
logistically. After the bruising defeats in the 1991 referendum and 1992 general elections, 
the party had no funds for a new media campaign. Furthermore, the party infrastructure 
and morale was greatly deflated, while the PNP was well-funded and optimistic about 
their chances in the plebiscite they instigated. Accordingly, the PNP began their public 
media campaign in favor of statehood on July 4, 1993 with a series of television 
advertisements, public appearances, and rallies. Meanwhile, the PPD continued with their 
traditional celebration of the anniversary of commonwealth status with an island-wide 
rally centered in the city of Caguas on July, 25. This celebration of the Commonwealth 
Constitution was the PPD’s first public foray into plebiscitary politics and came 21 days 
after the pro-statehood campaign began in earnest. However, the actual PPD campaign 
wouldn’t begin for another month. On August, 28, now less than 2 ½ months from the 
plebiscite, the PPD held a “telethon” to raise funds for the pro-commonwealth campaign. 
The telethon was a great success, raising $775,000 dollars for the campaign. Still, by pro-
commonwealth campaign estimates, the PNP had already spent over half that amount in 
their campaign for statehood on television, radio and other advertisements.24 
In the two weeks following the telethon, the PPD released its first television 
advertisements in favor of commonwealth status, with the slogan of “Commonwealth: the 
                                                 
23
 Benítez de Rexach. 60. 
24
 Ibid., 90-91. 
  
 
24 
 
 
 
best of both worlds.” The first round of ads in favor of statehood had emphasized the 
alleged economic benefits of statehood, and repeated their mantra: “Statehood, the only 
guaranteed permanent union,” referencing Puerto Rico’s supposedly tenuous pact with 
the United States. One commercial focused on statehood as the option “full of zeros,” 
referencing not only the increased federal funds the PNP expected to receive as a fully-
incorporated state, but also invoking the Puerto Rican Electoral Commission mandated 
symbol for statehood, a circle.25 The commonwealth campaign had two themes in its first 
wave of television advertisements: both highlighted commonwealth as “the best of both 
worlds,” but the second theme focused directly on Puerto Rican nationalism as it showed 
a victorious Puerto Rican basketball player react to the physical action of covering up the 
“Puerto Rico” logo on his jersey. This ad directly addressed and exploited a deeply held 
fear in Puerto Rico that statehood would rule out any recognition of Puerto Rico in 
international competitions, including the Olympics and Miss Universe pageants. These 
ads were viewed as highly successful by commonwealth advocates.26 
After the PPD commercials broke out into the public sphere, the PNP changed its 
advertising strategy and focused the pro-statehood campaign on one figure, Governor 
Roselló. Attempting to shift debate from the status question to the popularity of the 
governor, Roselló became the only person to speak for the statehood option. Meanwhile, 
the PPD organized many speakers and emphasized the importance of keeping the same 
status, over the draw of celebrity. This was an important shift, as a newspaper poll in 
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August, 1993 cited that 91 percent of the PPD would vote for Commonwealth, while only 
78 percent of the PNP would vote for statehood.27 A new poll in October found that only 
76 percent of those who voted for Governor Roselló planned to vote for statehood.28 
Regardless, opinion polls on the plebiscite itself repeatedly placed Commonwealth and 
Statehood in a statistical tie.29 
On November 14, 1993, a plurality of voters supported Commonwealth. The final 
count after nearly 1.8 million ballots were cast was 48.6 percent in favor of 
Commonwealth, 46.3 percent supporting Statehood, and 4.4 percent for Independence.30 
Although the PPD had garnered the most votes, the PNP finished a close second and 
emphasized that no option had received a majority of votes; the 1993 plebiscite had not 
settled the status debate. 
The 1996 general election once again inflated the hopes of statehood advocates as 
Governor Roselló was reelected by an even larger margin than in 1992.31 Having 
achieved a majority vote for governor, a feat not realized since 1972, statehood advocates 
recharged their efforts to solve the status issue. Governor Roselló announced plans for a 
new plebiscite on status to be held in 1998. Not only did the PNP win the governorship, 
but also held overwhelming majorities in both houses of the Puerto Rican Congress. With 
PNP dominance, the terms of the 1998 plebiscite seemed to favor statehood. 
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Governor Roselló asserted a graduated process to define status, advocating for 
statehood as he went. First, an open plebiscite with four status options would be held in 
1998 to determine the will of Puerto Ricans. Afterward, a bill would be proposed in 
Congress to support the Puerto Ricans preferred status option. Lastly, this bill would be 
voted upon in a yes-or-no referendum in Puerto Rico. Because the 1998 plebiscite did not 
originate in the U.S. Congress, many liberties were taken from the 1993 format. 
Specifically, four options, not three, would be presented to the people of Puerto Rico. In 
1993, three options were placed on the ballot: “Statehood,” “Commonwealth,” and 
“Independence.”32 In 1998, a fourth option was added, allegedly to reflect a growing 
movement within the PPD that promoted a new “Enhanced Commonwealth.”33 The 
definitions of each option reflected the PNP and PIP belief that the current 
commonwealth status was a “colonial” status. The definition of “Commonwealth” that 
accompanied each ballot stated that the commonwealth government was subject to the 
authority of the federal government according to the Territorial Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.34 Meanwhile, the “Enhanced Commonwealth” definition claimed an 
association with the United States that was “not colonial, not territorial.”35 
As many politicians and pundits anticipated with these four definitions, the PPD 
was split. Commonwealth advocates settled on a position and appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. In Báez Galib v. Commonwealth, PPD Senator Báez 
Galib argued that the four option ballot violated Puerto Ricans’ right to free speech and 
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petitioned the court to add a fifth column: “None of the above.”36 After short deliberation, 
the Supreme Court agreed with Báez Galib’s argument, but ruled that because it was an 
issue of free speech, no political party could promote the option with public campaign 
financing. The PPD had won, yet they were required to privately finance the campaign 
for “None of the above.” Similar to the effort in 1993, the PPD was fractured and poorly 
financed due in part to their crushing defeat in the 1996 general elections. 
On December 13th, 1998, only three months after Hurricane Georges devastated 
the Southern coast of Puerto Rico and two weeks after the FBI arrested a prominent PNP 
mayor on charges of corruption, Puerto Ricans again voted for their preferred status. In 
1998, however, “None of the above” attained a clear majority of votes, with 50.3 percent 
of the nearly 1.6 million votes cast. 
While researchers have investigated and attempted to decipher the 1993 plebiscite 
on status, little scholarly work has been produced to decipher the meaning of the 1998 
vote. Some politicos and pundits believe the vote was used to reproach Governor Roselló, 
while others have interpreted “None of the above” to represent the PPD’s traditional 
vision for commonwealth or a protest vote against the plebiscite generally. In 1999, 
research on the Puerto Rican question shifted to the plight of Vieques, an island with 
approximately 10,000 residents and a live-fire target range for military practice and war 
games. As social unrest blossomed in 1999 as the result of the accidental death of a local 
Puerto Rican, the results of the 1998 plebiscite faded from political prominence. In the 
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following chapters, I resurrect the importance of the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites as direct 
representations of the will of Puerto Ricans to answer the status question.
  
“The message is clear, federal transfers are important to all, and they are especially 
important to those who support statehood.” 1 
 
“Colonialism is a political-economic-legal constraint that assumes the existence of 
economic exploitation and impedes the adoption of policies intended to break the cycle of 
dependency.”2 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Political Status in an Economic Framework 
 
 
During a 1990 subcommittee briefing on status in the House of Representatives, 
the Congressional Research Service cited that “about 62 percent of Puerto Rico’s 
population had incomes below the Federal poverty level, compared with about 12 percent 
of the United States population.”3 Likewise, “Puerto Rico’s 1988 per capita personal 
income of $5,157 was only half that of Mississippi’s $10,992, the State with the lowest 
per capita income.”4 These statistics were repeated and dwelled upon throughout the 
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1989-1991 deliberations in congress regarding bills providing for a plebiscite on status in 
Puerto Rico.  
While the compatibility of the economies of Puerto Rico and the United States is 
a fundamental tenet of the status debate, that this tenet was emphasized sheds light on the 
way Congress views political status. Congress and many others view Puerto Rican 
political status through an economic framework of cost-benefit analyses. This economic 
lens frames the debate in terms of the costs and benefits of each political status option, 
and purports that those deciding Puerto Rico’s status are rational actors who will 
logically chose the option that offers the most benefits with the least costs. While I offer 
this framework primarily in response to congressional hearings on status, various scholars 
have utilized this economic lens. A logical cost-benefit framework has been heavily 
relied upon by the pro-statehood party, the PNP, during the campaigns leading up to the 
1993 and 1998 plebiscites on status. 
 Scholars have long believed that Puerto Rican political status revolves around the 
question of how the Puerto Rican economy should interact with that of the United States. 
José Javier Colón Morera argues that the status debate, for the United States, was 
prompted by congressional displeasure with Puerto Rico’s dependent economic status.5 
He quotes Richard Weiskoff’s 1985 work Factories and Food Stamps: The Puerto Rican 
Model of Development. “The economic problem can be approached [and] indeed solved, 
only as part of the solution to the status question.”6 After approving the Commonwealth 
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Constitution in 1952,7 the federal government acknowledged that was Puerto Rico had 
been, but was no longer a U.S. colony; Puerto Ricans had freely chosen to continue in 
association with the United States.8 Recent scholarship has questioned this stance. Many 
scholars of nationalism argue that Puerto Rico’s political status has not changed in nature 
since 1900.9 Thus, Puerto Rico remains a colony with little ability to control its economy. 
“As Carr (1985), Bloomfield (1985), and Negrón (1986, 1991) have underscored, without 
political means to direct its economic activity, the Island [sic] will remain as a passive 
recipient of the effects of federal policies not formulated to tackle the specific needs of a 
Caribbean developing nation.”10   
 An economic framework has often been used in the status debate not only to 
shape the issues discussed, but also to define which issues of status should be emphasized 
and which should be marginalized. This is particularly true with respect to congressional 
attempts from 1989-1991 to pass legislation mandating a plebiscite on status in Puerto 
Rico for 1991. While none of the legislation offered was passed, the congressional record 
of hearings, reports, and floor debate all demonstrate the power of the economic 
framework to shape status into a cost-benefit analysis of the three options offered by the 
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political parties of Puerto Rico. Notably, Congress seemed to reject statehood for the 
same reason the PNP promoted: Puerto Rico would receive more federal funding.11 
 Logically, the economic framework emphasizes the importance of traditional 
economic factors and measurements, such as standards of living, tax policies, and various 
financial incentives for businesses and individuals alike. Some adherents to the economic 
lens (who may or may not accept this title), recognize that cultural aspects indeed play a 
role in the status debate. While some cultural issues are easily aligned in economic terms 
including standards of living and poverty rates, issues need not neatly boil down to 
dollars and cents to be framed by an economic cost-benefit analysis of status. Rather, the 
economic framework is used to highlight a variety of topics, both economic and non-
economic. Perhaps the most contentious of the cultural issues included in the economic 
framework is the official language of the island. The Spanish-English divide helped to 
shape the status debate in Washington, D.C. as well as Puerto Rico and demonstrates the 
breadth of analysis of the economic framework. 
This chapter identifies and analyzes the economic framework of status. I argue 
that the economic framework employed in the debate classifies Puerto Rican political 
status as a rational choice, based on an objective analysis of a cost-benefit dichotomy of 
specific issues within the status debate. This means that rational actors (voters) are 
expected to shift importance from the broad themes of independence, assimilation, and 
autonomy, to the outcome or effect of individual issues with respect to each status option. 
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The economic lens encourages voters to question under which status formula they would 
profit the most. In this economic framework, the outcome and effect of each individual 
topic is described as either a positive or negative attribute of one status option. For 
instance, voters are not asked for their opinion regarding taxation, but instead are 
prompted to ponder whether a tax policy under statehood, commonwealth, or 
independence would best promote their own personal interests.  
Tax policy is just one aspect of the status debate that is framed in a positive-or-
negative dichotomy. Citizenship, official language, and conceptions of nationalism are 
also thrown into this economic framework in an attempt to rationalize these normative 
concepts. The economic lens promotes individuals to objectively analyze specific issues 
in hopes of translating personal interests into a yes vote for one status option. In the 
following pages I recount and explain what pundits and the U.S. Congress found while 
applying an economic framework to the Puerto Rican status debate. Specifically, this 
chapter analyzes traditionally economic issues including taxation, subsidies and benefits, 
as well as Puerto Rico’s historic importance as a military outpost and as a pawn in U.S. 
international public relations. The chapter then focuses on an investigation of cultural 
issues viewed through the economic framework, including Puerto Rico’s official 
language, citizenship and national sentiment as expressed in the Olympics and Miss 
Universe competitions. In the end I conclude, as other scholars have, that statehood 
appears to be more appealing when viewing the status debate through an economic 
framework. With this conclusion, I question the importance of the economic framework 
in light of the outcomes of the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites on status.  
  
 
34 
 
 
 
The Economic Framework 
After his reelection in 1988, Governor Rafael Hernández Colón of the PPD 
petitioned congress to implement a plebiscite in Puerto Rico to define the island’s 
political status. Beginning in 1989, various bills were introduced to both chambers of 
congress to create a plebiscite, culminating with the 1991 defeat of the Puerto Rican 
Status Referendum bill (S. 712). Following the multilateral spirit of the 1952 
Constitution, S.712 was crafted in consultation with the PPD, PNP, and PIP parties. U.S. 
Senators worked with each party in crafting the definitions of each status option, 
weighing the implications each would have on Puerto Rico and the United States to 
ensure that each option was mutually acceptable. The bill, supported by the three main 
political parties in Puerto Rico, became the basis of the 1993 plebiscite on status 
prompted by pro-statehood Governor Pedro Roselló.  
While S.712 was not passed, it is instructive of the issues Congress and the Puerto 
Rican political parties viewed as important and were a precursor to the campaigns for the 
1993 plebiscite on status. However, before any deliberation began, three guiding 
principles were created in Congress to guide any change in status: 
• “first, that there ought to be an even playing field, politically between the 
three political parties with regard to the status options;  
• second, that there ought to be a smooth transition so that any change in 
political status, to statehood or independence, ought to work economically; and  
• third, economic adjustment should be revenue-neutral to the extent possible, 
in that it does not cost the Treasury additional dollars over a period of time.”12 
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These principles shaped deliberations in Congress by emphasizing the importance of 
economic issues and invoke the economic framework when stressing that any resolution 
of status be economically sound and not burden the U.S. treasury. An examination of 
Puerto Rican status with regard to tax policy demonstrates these congressional concerns. 
 
Puerto Rico and Federal Taxes and Benefits 
As an organized, unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico’s relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Code wavers between treatment as a state and as a foreign country. For 
the purposes of this paper, the Internal Revenue Code can be divided in two categories: 
its treatment of individuals, and of businesses and corporations. In both categories Puerto 
Rico is the exception to the rules set forth for states and foreign countries.13 
Generally, residents of Puerto Rico do not pay Federal income taxes, yet they 
contribute to Social Security and Unemployment Insurance and pay income taxes to the 
Commonwealth Government. If Puerto Rico were to become a state, residents would be 
subject to pay both federal and state taxes, a fact often highlighted by the commonwealth 
party when campaigning for commonwealth status. The PPD alleges that this new tax 
burden would stifle the economy, create a disincentive to work and financially hurt 
Puerto Rico overall. As expected, Statehood advocates retort that a new tax system could 
create new incentives to work. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation conclude 
both options to be possible, as a new state tax system would be required under statehood 
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to reflect a shift in financial responsibilities from the Commonwealth Government to the 
Federal Government.14 
Regardless of a new tax code, Federal benefits to individual residents would 
increase under statehood. As U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans are granted access to Federal 
benefit programs including Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC), Medicaid, 
Medicare, Social Security, Adult Assistance and a Federal Nutrition Assistance Program 
(food stamps). However, funding from the federal government for AFDC, adult 
assistance and nutrition assistance programs in Puerto Rico is not based on the eligibility 
of residents, as it is for states. Rather, funds for federal programs in Puerto Rico are 
subject to Federal caps mandated by Congress. If funding were based on eligibility, it is 
clear that the federal government would be required to send more money to the island. 
For instance, “the Federal share of Puerto Rico’s adult assistance program was $2.9 
million. The average monthly payment was $32, plus half of actual shelter costs, 
compared with the U.S. average under SSI (the equivalent program for states) of $362 a 
month.”15 If Puerto Rico were to become a state, beneficiaries of Federal assistance 
programs could expect an increase of eleven fold, with a corresponding increase in cost 
to the Federal government.16 Such an increase in benefits was highlighted by the PNP in 
their statehood plebiscitary campaign. Though the PPD believed such increases to be 
disincentives to work, they did not contest that more transfer payments would accompany 
statehood. 
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Likewise, statehood would bring dramatic changes to business interactions with 
the government. Scholars and pundits alike have identified one crucial provision of the 
U.S. tax code as perhaps the most important with relation to the status debate in the early 
1990s.17 The possessions tax credit under section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code “may 
eliminate all income tax on a domestic corporation doing business in Puerto Rico where 
the corporation is also excused from Puerto Rican income tax pursuant to a tax incentive 
provided under Puerto Rican law…”18 In effect, 936 businesses, as they became known, 
paid no Puerto Rican tax and no Federal tax on their profits, which encouraged 
investments from the U.S. While section 936 was recognized by every political party as 
an important economic tool for the island’s manufacturing based economy, each party 
took a different stance on what to do about it. Autonomists elected to leave the tax code 
untouched and independence advocates wanted to immediately revoke the provision upon 
the creation of a new republic. In accordance with the Uniformity Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, 19 statehood supporters wanted to gradually phase-out the tax credit to 
minimize any impact on the Puerto Rican economy. Celeste Benítez, who organized the 
PPD’s 1993 plebiscitary campaign, cites section 936 as one crucial factor that led to 
commonwealth’s success. “The plebiscitary campaign and the triumph of commonwealth 
was stamped with the luck of Section 936.” 20 
                                                 
17
 Celeste Benítez, Juan M. García-Passalacqua, and José Javier Colón Morera, among others, emphasize 
the importance of section 936. 
18
 Tax rules relating to Puerto Rico… 10 
19
 Deutch, Philip Joseph. “The Uniformity Clause and Puerto Rican Statehood.” Stanford Law Review. v. 
43, No. 3. (1991): 685-732. JSTOR. 731-732 
20
 Benítez de Rexach. El día que Puerto Rico habló: el plebiscite de 1993. 127 
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In the economic frame of status, statehood and commonwealth would both incur 
positive and negative effects from the Internal Revenue Code and Federal benefit 
programs. The PNP emphasized the expected increase in Federal benefits to residents 
when campaigning for the 1993 plebiscite on status, while they minimized the actual 
impact of section 936 incentives to businesses and purported income of Federal income 
taxes. The PPD emphasized the opposite during their successful campaign in 1993. 
However, the PPD lost an important talking point when Congress repealed the section 
936 possessions tax credit in 1996.21 Though it was replaced by a nearly identical section 
30A Economic Activity Credit, which applies only to Puerto Rico (not other U.S. 
possessions and territories), commonwealth advocates could not rely on the popularly 
recognized section 936 in the 1998 plebiscite on status. 
 
“Permanent” and “Statutory” U.S. Citizenship  
 Puerto Rico’s alleged “colonized” status affects more than just the island’s 
economic relationship with the United States. While permanent residents were granted 
U.S. Citizenship beginning in 1917 based on birth within the geographic confines of 
Puerto Rico, statehood and independence advocates have long questioned the 
permanency of U.S. citizenship. As an offshoot from the PNP’s unsuccessful campaign 
for governor in 1988, in which they falsely accused Gov. Hernández Colón of promoting 
a new, “associated republic” status with the United States, proponents of statehood 
                                                 
21
 “Tax Relief Extension Reconciliation Act of 2005.” House Report 109-304: 109th Congress, 1st Session. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f: hr304.109.pdf 
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coined the term “statutory citizenship.”22 In this term, the PNP acknowledged the 
tenuous, colonized status of commonwealth. They claimed that congress could revoke 
U.S. Citizenship from Puerto Rican natives at any time, because it was an act of congress 
that granted Puerto Ricans U.S. Citizenship and not the U.S. Constitution.23 Statehood 
supporters argued that as an organized, unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico was subject 
to the whims of Congress that could become hostile to the island’s interest and retract 
funding and citizenship from islanders at any moment.  
In the 1993 plebiscitary campaign, the PNP promoted statehood as the only 
permanent union with the United States, noting that no state had ever successfully 
seceded from the union. The PPD countered this sentiment with the slogan: 
“Commonwealth: The best of both worlds,” highlighting U.S. Citizenship yet continued 
autonomy over island affairs. However, a 1989 Report of the Senate’s Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources rejected the 1952 Commonwealth Constitution as a 
bilateral compact of shared sovereignty over the island and instead recognized that Puerto 
Rico was ultimately governed as a territory by the Federal government.24 This conclusion 
reinforced the PNP’s simple assertions that Puerto Rican’s would secure permanent U.S. 
citizenship and increase Federal benefits under statehood. Yet,  it was ineffective in 
garnering a majority of votes for statehood in the 1993 plebiscite. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Benítez de Rexach. El día que Puerto Rico habló: el plebiscite de 1993. 19 
23
 The Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 granted Puerto Ricans U.S. Citizenship. 
24
 García-Passalacqua and Carlos Rivera Lugo.  79 
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Language of the State 
Puerto Rico’s colonial status prior to 1952 cannot be discounted when analyzing 
the official language of the island. While the Jones Act of 1917 recognized both English 
and Spanish as official languages, English had been mandated to be the primary language 
of the schools by various U.S. appointed governors before the first popularly elected 
governor was voted into office in 1948.25 Since that time, both English and Spanish have 
been recognized as official languages, though Spanish “is the language of daily life,” and 
is the dominant language used in Puerto Rican classrooms.26 In spite of this, in 1991 PPD 
Governor Hernández Colón signed Public Law #4, the “Spanish Only” law.27 Public Law 
#4 recognized only Spanish as the official language of Puerto Rico, and seemed to 
solidify the PNP’s assertion that Gov. Hernández Colón wanted more than autonomy 
from the United States. Still, the PNP purported throughout the 1989-1991 Congressional 
Hearings as well as the 1993 campaign for statehood, that Puerto Rico would retain both 
English and Spanish as official languages under a PNP governorship and under 
statehood. Reverting to aspects of the 1988 campaign against Colón, pro-statehood 
candidate Pedro Roselló won the governorship in 1992 and quickly signed a bill to 
reauthorize both Spanish and English as official languages of the island.  
Despite its legal recognition of bilingualism, Puerto Rico remains a 
predominantly Spanish speaking island, reflective of its Hispanic roots. This was a great 
cause for concern in Congress. Still, in both the 1993 and 1998 plebiscitary campaigns, 
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 Hernández. “Desarrollo de la nación de Puerto Rico.” 10 May 2006.  
26
 Briefing on Puerto Rico political status by the General Accounting Office (GAO)… 19 
27
 Benítez de Rexach. 23 
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the PNP advocated for “jíbaro statehood,”28 meaning that Puerto Rico should become a 
state of the union on their own terms—with Spanish as one of the official languages. 
These episodes in language politics exemplify the difficulty of viewing status 
primarily through an economic, cost-benefit lens. The “Spanish Only” Law put in place 
by the PPD deviated from Puerto Rican desires for bilingualism and played a large role in 
Governor Hernández Colón’s defeat in the 1992 elections. However, statehood advocates 
also lacked a solid foundation to promote bilingualism under their preferred status option. 
The United States has a history of forcing territories to promote English as the language 
of government and education in order to become a state.29 With respect to the official 
language of Puerto Rico, neither statehood nor commonwealth advocates had the correct 
answer in 1993 or 1998. 
 
International Recognition of the Puerto Rican Nation 
 Official language was not to be the only recognition of distinction between Puerto 
Rico and the United States. Under the Commonwealth Government, Puerto Rico 
competes in international competitions including the Olympics and Miss Universe 
pageants separate from the United States. However, these competitions are the only 
international recognition Puerto Rico receives. According to the Commonwealth 
Constitution, Puerto Rico may not be a party to any international treaties and, like a state, 
is subject to Federal authority in every other aspect of international relations. However, 
                                                 
28
 As a rural working man, the jíbaro is the mythic icon that symbolizes Puerto Rican-ness, similar to the 
guajiro of Cuba.  
29
 Trías Monge, José. Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World. New Haven Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1997. 185. 
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these competitions serve as a rally point for national pride. International competition 
draws great debate on the island and has ignited the passions of many people in favor of 
autonomy and continued participation. The PPD appealed directly to this national 
sentiment in a 1993 television advertisement alleging that Puerto Rico would be stripped 
of its international identity in such competitions if residents voted for statehood in the 
1993 plebiscite. Still, the PNP claimed that under jíbaro statehood, Puerto Rico would 
continue to compete.  
Much like the issue of official language, voters are not asked which policy 
outcome they like best, and instead must choose which party to believe. International 
competition is an important issue for advocates of statehood and commonwealth, and 
both parties contend that such competition would not change with their respective status 
preferences. Regardless of who is right, such an intense debate (which will be explored 
further in Chapter 3) is not easily settled by an objective analysis of the facts presented. 
Both the PPD and PNP promise to continue Puerto Rican participation in international 
competitions; this leaves the real question to be which party, and status option, to trust.    
 
The Puerto Rican Balance Sheet 
 Perhaps the most unifying concept found when examining each issue through the 
economic cost-benefit analysis is subjectivity. Throughout the course of the 1989-1991 
Congressional Hearings, as well as the 1993 and 1998 plebiscitary campaigns, statehood 
and commonwealth advocates asked voters to trust their vision of the status debate. 
However, as repeated throughout the 1989-1991 hearings, the specific implications of a 
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change in status with respect to taxation and benefits, citizenship, official language and 
international recognition are difficult to project. Furthermore, each specific issue can be 
interpreted differently by people in favor of the same political status. Thus, Governor 
Hernández Colón and his “Spanish Only” law were soundly rejected by statehood 
advocates as well as some commonwealth advocates in the 1992 general election. 
Division between and within the status options exist, and the affect of a new Puerto Rican 
political status would depend upon how any change would be implemented.30 
 Beyond the subjective interpretations of the status options projected into the 
public sphere by the PPD, PNP, and PIP, the three parties agreed on many fundamental 
issues. All three parties’ proposals in the 1989-1991 hearings agreed to: free trade with 
the United States, preserve manufacturing as a critical economic component, expand 
agricultural and tourist sectors, become less dependent on section 936 credits, fight 
unemployment beyond increased governmental opportunities, create an “indigenous” 
entrepreneurial sector, and reform the education system to emphasize “high skills.”31 
Likewise, the three parties agreed that U.S. military installations in Puerto Rico would 
not be altered by any change in status, including independence.32 
 With these major issues in common, the parties emphasized the purported 
differences in taxation and benefits, citizenship, official language, and international 
recognition that each status option offered. In this way, voters were presented with a 
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 Briefing on Puerto Rico political status by the General Accounting Office (GAO)…  and “Tax Relief 
Extension Reconciliation Act of 2005.” 
31
 Colón Morera. Economic Constraints and Political Choices... 464 
32
 Wide scale deliberations regarding the U.S. military presence in Puerto Rican territory did not begin until 
1999, when Puerto Rican David Sanes was killed in an accident while working on a military bombing 
range in Vieques, Puerto Rico. 
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rational choice: which option best serves my interest with respect to each issue and how 
do those issues define political status holistically? Although the vote was competitive in 
1993, Commonwealth won a plurality of votes and appeared to answer the question. A 
plurality of voters preferred the PPD’s vision of taxation and benefits systems, supported 
U.S. citizenship in spite of its precarious legal foundation, wanted both Spanish and 
English as official languages and were in favor of at least some international recognition 
of Puerto Rico as a distinct nation.  
It follows that in 1993, autonomy appears to more closely resemble the national 
results of the balance sheet than statehood or independence. Scholars argue that this 
sentiment was challenged when pro-statehood Governor Roselló was reelected in 1996 
by a majority of voters, with a margin of victory greater than any gubernatorial race in 
the last two decades.33 Governor Roselló directly questioned whether Puerto Ricans were 
in favor of Commonwealth when he called for a new plebiscite on status to be held in 
1998. This foray into the status debate, he argued, would be a true test of the sentiment of 
the island.34 For this reason, the 1998 plebiscite was not subject to congressional hearings 
or approval, but was offered as a first step toward petitioning congress for a change in 
status. 
                                                 
33
 Cámara, Luis Raúl. The Madness of Every Four Years... and Alvarez Rivera, interview by author. And 
Hernández, interview by author. 
34
 quoted in Cámara. “The Madness of Every Four Years…” Gov. Roselló stated in 1995 that Puerto Rico 
“is not, and had never been a nation.”  
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With five options on the ballot, the “Balance Sheet” for the 1998 plebiscite 
became more complex. The three thematic options of statehood, independence and 
autonomy were represented by four options. A fifth column, “None of the above,” 
allegedly allowed voters to voice their disapproval of the plebiscite.35 Due to constraints 
placed upon the fifth column by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,36 “None of the 
above” represented no costs or benefits; it did not represent a status option at all. Though 
statehood advocates believed statehood to be gaining momentum as section 936 credits 
were no longer part of the balance sheet, a majority of voters chose the only option with 
no costs or benefits. The majority vote for “None of the above” was radically different 
from the 1993 plebiscite results.  
Whether the economic framework Congress and scholars use to analyze status 
accurately represented and rationalized the outcome of the 1993 plebiscite is unknown. 
Many scholars and Congress have focused on economic factors like taxes and federal 
transfer payments to define the best status policy. Congress also extrapolated costs and 
benefits from non-economic factors like citizenship, state language, and forms of 
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international recognition for Puerto Ricans during their deliberations on status from 1989 
to 1991. Still, these deliberations did not decisively conclude the status debate in Puerto 
Rico or in Washington, D.C. 
Furthermore, the 1998 plebiscite results demonstrates that a strict economic, cost-
benefit analysis of the ballot options cannot be used. Puerto Ricans did not vote in favor 
of a tax and benefit policy, a definition of citizenship, a compromise on the language of 
the state, or some form of international recognition in 1998. They chose the option with 
no definition, the option that has no apparent costs or benefits.37 
The difference between the 1993 and the 1998 plebiscites indicate a departure 
from the importance Congress and scholars have placed on the economic framework of 
Puerto Rican political status. In the next chapter I depart from an economic, cost-benefit 
analysis of status. Chapter 3 investigates a non-economic mode of inquiry that 
emphasizes ideology. Though the economic framework attempted to incorporate 
intangible conceptions of culture via language and international recognition, many 
scholars have emphasized the power of ideological nationalisms to contextualize and 
interpret the status debate.
                                                 
37
 Some scholars argue that “None of the above” was a vote for the “status quo.” I refute this argument in 
Chapter 4. 
  
 
Chapter 3: Contested Nationalisms in Puerto Rico 
 
 
What shade of blue truly represents the people of Puerto Rico? This seemingly 
insignificant question was fought out in a bloodless battle in the halls of the capitol 
building with reverberations throughout the island and beyond until an official 
“armistice” was ratified by the Puerto Rican Department of State on August 3, 1995.1 The 
point of contention was the proper shade of blue for the equilateral triangle situated on 
the mast-side of Puerto Rico’s official flag. Both historical tradition and modern day 
politics collided to create an uproar illustrative of the Puerto Rican question: What should 
be Puerto Rico’s political status with the United States? The flag color debate mirrored 
the general status debate as advocates of independence, statehood, and commonwealth 
each had a different color preference. Supporters of commonwealth status were generally 
in favor of “sky blue” for the official flag, while proponents of statehood preferred a 
                                                 
1
 Reglamentos de Puerto Rico. “Reglamento sobre el Uso en Puerto Rico de la Bandera del Estado Libre 
Asociado de Puerto Rico.” LexJuris Puerto Rico. Reglamento Núm. 5282 del 3 de agosto de 1995  
http://www.lexjuris.com/Reglamentos/estado/lex955282 percent20bandera.htm 
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“navy blue” similar to the blue used in the U.S. flag, and independence advocates often 
used a shade of blue lighter than the other two. 
 In Puerto Rico, the contested color of the national flag reflects the contested 
nature of the Puerto Rican nation. Both flag color and the status debate exemplify the 
dynamic character of nation and nationalism in Puerto Rico. In this chapter, I discuss 
recent incarnations of Puerto Rican nationalisms in the political status debate. While a 
great deal of scholarship has emphasized the importance of Puerto Rican nationalism in 
independence movements, I argue that nationalist sentiment permeates all three status 
options for Puerto Rico. Due to the abundance of nationalist scholarship regarding 
independence movements, I emphasize the nationalisms of statehood and commonwealth 
status as they were articulated in the 1990s plebiscitary campaigns. The nationalisms of 
commonwealth and statehood politics are important as both options consistently receive 
strong support in Puerto Rican electoral politics. Thus, the nationalisms of 
commonwealth and statehood status more accurately reflect the relevance of the 
nationalist framework in the overarching status debate, than nationalisms of 
independence advocates. 
 However, it is imperative to recognize that “nation” and “nationalism” are not 
only the topic of debate in Puerto Rico, but they are also contested terms in an extensive 
body of theoretical literature. First, I recount the individualistic interpretations of 
nationalism in Puerto Rico to emphasize the importance of the nationalist framework. In 
order to analyze Puerto Rican expressions of nationalism, I situate “nation” and 
“nationalism” in the relevant literature and theory. I then locate Puerto Rico as a nation 
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via individualistic interpretations of Puerto Rican history, geography, society, and 
symbols through the flag debate. After establishing the theoretical foundations of the 
nationalist framework, I recognize that expressions of the framework persist in Puerto 
Rico. Still, I argue that the nationalist framework fails to holistically represent the Puerto 
Rican status debate.  
 
Individual Expressions of Nationalism 
 Nationalism has been studied by a variety of scholars who, in some aspects of the 
concept, have arrived at a consensus. In the following section I will briefly recount the 
conceptual development of nationalism by discussing the two dominant fissures in the 
theoretical study of nationalism, which eventually led to a relative consensus. Though 
most scholars have discounted primordialism in favor of a social constructionist view of 
nationalism, the debate is worth revisiting. The second fissure dissects the principal 
concepts that give shape to the social construction of nation, including instrumentalist 
views of kinship, elites and class. The relevance of these theories is clear when one 
recognizes “nationalism” as a powerful force in everyday life. 
While the color of the flag and the political status of Puerto Rico have been hotly 
contested, there is also a degree of consensus among the populace. Walking in San Juan 
during one of the capitol city’s many festivals, the masses of people on the street hardly 
think twice as they repeatedly chant, “I am a Boricua, just so you know!”2 to the sound of 
                                                 
2
 “¡Yo soy boricua, pa’ que tu lo sepas!” The word “Boricua” is commonly used in place of “Puerto Rican” 
for reasons I will discuss later in the paper. This is one of many musical slogans, somewhat similar to 
nursery rhymes, which everyone knows and sings aloud, led by roaming bands of amateur and professional 
musical troupes during festivals on the island. 
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beating hand drums. Likewise, inhabitants of the island can often be found passionately 
performing Marc Anthony’s “Preciosa” in karaoke bars, joining together to sing the 
finale: “No matter what happens I will be Puerto Rican, I love you Puerto Rico!”3 These 
two seemingly innocuous examples of popular culture demonstrate the reach of 
nationalism into daily life. References to “being Puerto Rican” are implicitly understood, 
despite the ambiguity of “Puerto Rican-ness” specifically, and “nation” generally. 
 It can seem natural to include or exclude various actions and situations under a 
heading of “nationalism.” In other words, the theoretical boundaries of nationality appear 
logical or based in common sense, and lead to a straightforward identification process of 
what is, and what is not an expression of nationalism. It would seem easy, without the 
help of an organized, academic theoretical framework, to focus a case study of 
nationalism on specific symbols or examples of nationalism, such as a national flag, a 
slogan or song invoking the nation, or another symbol that resonates with a 
geographically specific population. 
 However, nationalism is not a simple concept. Rather, I argue that this extremely 
complex set of concepts unified under the broad headings “nation” and “nationalism” are 
so pervasive in society that they seem natural to the individual, and can be evoked and 
superficially understood via rudimentary symbols like the color of a flag, or a simply 
worded phrase. A pseudo-consensus exists regarding Puerto Rican nationalism in part 
because many symbols of the nation are ambiguous. As Marc Anthony bellows “I love 
you Puerto Rico,” the listener must interpret what Puerto Rico is and who belongs to it. In 
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 “Preciosa” performed by Marc Anthony. Desde un principio. Sony International. 1999. “¡Aunque pase lo 
que pase, yo seré puertorriqueño! ¡Yo te quiero Puerto Rico!”  
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this way nationalism can be viewed as a primarily individualistic sentiment. While 
nationalism is socially constructed (which will be described later) and is therefore a 
communal concept, each individual must decide which parts, if any, of the socially 
constructed nation to accept as truth and which parts to consider less-important or 
discount completely. That nationalisms can be personal conceptions of social 
constructions is supported by the Jewish Nationalist Ahad Ha’am when he states, “Once, 
however, the spirit of nationality has so come into being… it becomes a phenomenon that 
concerns the individual alone, its reality being dependent on nothing but its presence in 
his psyche, and on no external or objective actuality.”4  
 
The Nationalist Framework 
 The simple task of identifying for oneself what is a national symbol is 
complicated when undertaken as a group. Nationalism is extremely complicated 
collection of concepts and metaphors, when individual interpretations lead individual 
actors to join together for a common cause. The discourse of nationhood is employed 
almost continuously in the United States and Puerto Rico, and as explained by Paul R. 
Brass and others, has been applied and analyzed in nearly every “modern” nation-state 
and even some not-so-modern nation-states.5 More important than the fact that 
                                                 
4
 Ahad Ha’am quoted in an extract by Elie Kedourie titled, “Nationalism and Self-Determination.” in John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994. 54. 
5
 Brass explains nationalisms in South Asia, India, and the Soviet Union in Ethnicity and Nationalism. 
Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities, describes various formulations of nationalisms present 
throughout the western hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, including Russia, China and Japan 
amongst others. Ernest Gellner even applies nationalism to Megalomania and Ruritania in an extract titled 
“Nationalism and High Cultures” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism. New 
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.  
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nationalism has been utilized to varying degrees across the globe, nationalism is almost 
universally understood. It is this universal understanding of nationalism that demonstrates 
the first theoretical division in the academic theories of nationalism. Brass explains that 
there is a  
fundamental difference among scholars concerning the very nature of the 
groups involved, namely, whether they are ‘natural,’ ‘primordial,’ ‘given’ 
communities or whether they are creations of interested leaders, of elite 
groups, or of the political system in which they are included.6 
 
He attributes this division within the theories of nationalism to the works of various 
authors but draws the conclusion that the difference can best be summed up as a 
“primordialist” view versus an “instrumentalist” view where the “latter term refers to a 
perspective that emphasizes the uses to which cultural symbols are put by elites seeking 
instrumental advantage for themselves or the groups they claim to represent.”7  
 Indeed, Brass recognizes primordialism as a formerly influential theory and then 
justifiably discounts it as too narrow to accurately reflect applications of nationalism in 
the world. A strict adherence to primordialism envisioned physical features and tangible 
attachments such as birthplace, race, skin tone, or direct blood relations, as the various 
causes of nationalism.8 Brass implicitly discounts this theory of nationalism when he 
explains his vision of an instrumentalist view of nationalism. However, he appears to 
discount the value of primordial characteristics in his instrumentalist vision when he 
hesitates to accept that elites may employ such characteristics for their advantage or the 
                                                 
6
 Brass, Paul R. “Elite Competition and Nation-Formation” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds.) Nationalism. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 83. 
7
 Ibid., 333. 
8
 Geertz, Clifford. “Primordial and Civic Ties” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) 
Nationalism. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 29-34. 
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advantage of the people they represent. It would be outrageous to assume that elites 
would not use primordial attachments instrumentally for their benefit, unless primordial 
attachments do not exist. The location of an individual’s birth, however, is a tangible, 
physical truth, and thus primordial,9 and has been employed to instill nationalist 
sentiment (particularly regarding citizenship under the doctrine of Jus Soli).  
 More appropriate than a juxtaposition of primordialism and instrumentalism 
would be one contrasting primordialism and social constructionism. Perhaps 
unconsciously, Brass falls into the latter category as he states, “it is not actual descent 
that is considered essential to the definition of an ethnic group, but a belief in common 
descent,”10 and that “new cultural groups can be created for the purposes of political and 
economic domination.”11 By accentuating the importance of a belief in ethnicity and the 
fluidity of cultural groups, Brass rejects a static, primordial view of culture and 
nationalism and embraces a modern view of these concepts and implicitly accepts that 
there may be different causes for different nationalisms. 
 Still, social constructionism alone does not specifically detail a causal argument 
for the creation of nationalisms around the globe. After discrediting a strict adherence to 
primordialism, Brass’ instrumentalist theory of nationalisms offers a universal, causal 
principle that provides for the creation of disparate nationalisms around the world: elite 
competition.12 Specifically, he argues that an elite class in any given geographic location, 
                                                 
9
 Strong adherents to a post-modernist philosophy might disagree with this view. While I admit that the 
definition of the location of birth is socially constructed and accepted, I would argue that the physical, 
geographic location exists regardless of its socially constructed definition. 
10
 Brass. “Elite Competition and Nation-Formation.” 83. My emphasis.  
11
 Ibid., 86 
12
 Ibid., and Brass. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. 
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which may be comprised of economically, politically and religiously powerful persons, 
competes within itself to define the nation and its symbols for that geographic location. It 
is important to note that this competition, in Brass’ view, takes place within the elite 
class, and that the winner or winners of this perpetual competition present their version of 
nationalism to the masses. Brass provides various scenarios of elite competition including 
the competition between elites from within the geographic location, as well as 
competition between local and foreign elites who attempt to impose their vision of the 
nation from afar. He predicts that such competition may take on many forms, but offers 
two primary avenues of contestation: appealing directly to the masses for approval via 
elections, and competition between elites for the approval of higher ranking elites via 
appointments. Brass also describes two main concepts, religion and language, over which 
nationalism can be contested by elites. He alleges that both can play integral roles in elite 
competitions, though he doesn’t identify them as the sole areas of contestation. 
 The concept of elite competition does give a generally universal rule that can be 
applied to case studies of nationalism in various geographic locations. It is applicable in 
part because the concept of elite competition is extremely general. While over-
generalization may be a drawback to a theory in most academic bodies of literature, it can 
be seen in this instance as a positive attribute. By generalizing the concept with the 
relatively universal term “elites,” Brass recognizes that nationalisms vary greatly both 
between distinct geographic locations and within them depending upon the elites who are 
competing to promote their formulation of nationalism. 
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 However, Brass’ elite competition nationalism is not the only dissection of the 
social constructionist theory of nationalism. Notably, Pierre Van Den Berghe offers a 
social constructionist variation of primordialism in his vision of nationalism as an 
extension of ethnicity and kinship in an extract entitled “A Socio-Biological 
Perspective.”13 He explains how individual actors prefer to associate with and help those 
they believe to be most closely related to, thus a nation is conceptually an individual’s 
greatly extended family. Van Den Berghe’s theory of nationalism gives more credence to 
primordial characteristics in the creation of nation but emphasizes that the primordial 
characteristics utilized to create modern nations are not primordial, but actually socially 
constructed versions of primordial characteristics. While his theory does provide a 
systematic view of nationalism that is applicable to Puerto Rico, the system cannot be 
generalized in order to apply to the modern applications in multi-ethnic states. As such, I 
view Van Den Berghe’s theory of kinship nationalisms as an important component of 
Puerto Rican nationalism, which I will describe later. Ultimately, however, Van Den 
Berghe’s theory can be applied within Brass’ vision of nationalism and does not 
constitute an overarching theory of nationalism that is as applicable as elite competition. 
 Just as Van Den Berghe offers an important insight and a new lens through which 
to view Brass’ theory of nationalism, Benedict Anderson’s important work, Imagined 
Communities, elucidates the context of Puerto Rican nationalism through another social 
constructionist lens. In his book, Anderson explains that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon that was first utilized in the colonized Western hemisphere and emphasized 
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 Van Den Berghe, Pierre. “A Socio-Biological Perspective” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds.) Nationalism. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 96-103. 
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the importance of language in the creation of nation.14 Interestingly, in their respective 
major works Brass and Anderson do not cite each other as resources, even though on a 
very broad scale both theorists emphasize the consequence of elite actors creating 
nationalism with a significant focus on language.15 Still, a very important distinction can 
be made between the two theories. While Brass emphasizes the importance of various 
forms of competition among elites, Anderson attributes elite competition to capitalistic 
market factors, especially the dissemination of the printing press. In doing so, Anderson 
does not give proper credit to the possibility that more than one set of elites exists and 
that they compete against each other in order to wield the tools of nationalism such as the 
printing press and various vernaculars. 
In the preceding section, I have briefly recounted the major debates within the 
theories of nationalism. Perhaps the most important theory of nationalism that was not 
presented is best represented by James Blaut’s update of a Marxist theory of nationalism. 
This theory proposes that the proletariat, and not solely the elites, uses nationalism to 
pursue state sovereignty.16 While Blaut portrays his theory as an all-encompassing vision 
of nationalism that caters specifically to colonized peoples (and refers specifically to 
Puerto Rico), his Marxist view emphasizes the importance of nationalism as a means to 
attain state sovereignty and relegates the goal of autonomy to another work.17  
                                                 
14
 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New 
York, New York: Verso, 1983. 46. 
15
 Ibid. and Brass. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. 
16
 Blaut, James M. The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism. Newark, New Jersey: 
Zed Books, 1987. 
17
 Ibid., 13-16. Blaut explicitly states that autonomy may be a goal of nationalism, but instead focuses on 
absolute sovereignty.  
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Unfortunately, Blaut never transcends the concepts of sovereignty and only 
emphasizes nationalisms of the independence movement.18 As Puerto Ricans have twice 
voted in favor of political autonomy in national plebiscites, both times leaving 
independence in a distant third place or worse, it is imperative that any applicable theory 
of nationalism accommodates nationalist movements that pursue political goals other 
than sovereignty. Because Blaut primarily discounts autonomy as a viable goal of 
nationalist movements, I must continue to base my analysis of Puerto Rican nationalisms 
in Brass’ elite competition theory of nationalism as the most broadly applicable theory. 
 
Political and Social Nationalisms in Puerto Rico 
 Recent nationalisms in Puerto Rico can begin to be interpreted through Brass’ 
concept of elite competition. Elite competitions exist between the three main political 
parties in electoral contests on the island, as well as within the political parties 
themselves as they attempt to create cohesive messages for the public to consume 
regarding nationalism. Political parties in Puerto Rico were specifically created and are 
perpetuated based on each party’s vision of Puerto Rican nationalism, as each party is 
founded on a different preference for a political status with the United States.  
The voting populace of Puerto Rico has been split nearly in half between 
advocates for full incorporation as the 51st state of the United States (as represented by 
the PNP) and those who advocate for a more legally ambiguous, permanent union with 
the United States (as represented by the PPD). While the Puerto Rican Independence 
                                                 
18
 Blaut and Loida Figueroa. Aspectos de la cuestión nacional en Puerto Rico. San Juan, Puerto Rico: 
Editorial Claridad, 1988. 5-6. 
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Party (the PIP) still holds “major party status” under Puerto Rican law, the movement for 
absolute sovereignty has been supported historically by approximately 5 percent of the 
voting population.19 It is for this reason, that James Blaut’s modern Marxist theory of 
nationalism is not applicable to Puerto Rico. While Blaut espouses the virtues of his 
Marxist theory of nationalism in explaining movements for independence, most Puerto 
Ricans do not support Puerto Rican national sovereignty as expressed by traditional 
methods of electoral competition. 
 However, before interpreting current Puerto Rican nationalisms, it is important to 
understand and analyze the roots of nationalism found in the island’s historical trajectory. 
The use of violence against colonial powers occupying the island can be traced as far 
back as 1511, when the indigenous Taínos unsuccessfully rebelled against Spanish 
colonial powers. However, it is questionable at best to argue that such a rebellion was the 
fruit of nationalist sentiment. Rather, the conception of Puerto Rican nationalism is often 
attributed to the 1868 Grito de Lares,20 which was a movement by rural middle and lower 
class inhabitants of the island who rose up in arms against the Spanish Empire to declare 
independence for Puerto Rico. This violent uprising is still celebrated by proponents of 
Puerto Rican independence. In the decade following the insurrection, official political 
parties were established on the island that were based on political status preferences. 
Many individuals in the party in power, the Conservatives, were referred to as 
incondicionales, in reference to their unconditional support for Spanish imperial rule of 
                                                 
19
 de Lourdes Santiago Negrón. 
20
 Grito de Lares roughly translates to the “Cry of Lares,” which was a call to arms in the Southwest town 
of Lares for those advocating for Puerto Rican independence. While independence activists successfully 
took the town, the insurrection was quelled by the Spanish Army as they advanced toward the next town.  
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Puerto Rico. The two current political parties often trace their beginnings to the often 
persecuted Liberal Reformist party. At different times factions within the Liberal 
Reformist party advocated for different versions of autonomy within the Spanish Empire. 
The assimilationists, as they were referred, promoted the incorporation of Puerto Rico 
into Spain as a province, with equal representation in the Spanish Imperial Court. Later, 
an autonomist faction led the Liberal Reformist party and proposed autonomy for Puerto 
Rico, including the right to self-govern and sign treaties with other countries.21 
 Both of the political parties under Spanish rule, much like the current political 
parties, diffused visions of nationalism as they advocated for various political status 
formulations with Spain. It is clear that the independence advocates from the Grito de 
Lares, as well as the assimilationists and autonomists of the Liberal Reformist party 
articulated visions of Puerto Rico as a distinct nation. It is important to recognize, 
however, that even the incondicionales utilized nationalism when promoting the 
acceptance of Spanish rule on the island. According to James Blaut’s interpretation of 
Lenin’s Marxist theory of nationalism, the incondicionales were promoting a form of 
“great nationalism” as opposed to the “narrow nationalisms” of the independence 
advocates, assimilationists and autonomists.22  
Current political parties can be viewed in the same light. Modern independence 
advocates envision Puerto Rico as its own nation, separate from and equal to the United 
States. Likewise, the PPD which opposes both independence and U.S. statehood, believes 
                                                 
21
 The autonomists eventually attained their goal of self-government in late 1897. They had no time to 
govern, however, as the United States invaded Puerto Rico in 1898 under the auspices of the Spanish-
American War. 
22
 Blaut. The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism. 13-16. 
  
 
60 
 
 
 
that Puerto Rico is a nation of people distinct from the United States but asserts that 
autonomy through self-government is an acceptable political expression of the nation.23 
Just as the incondicionales of the late 19th century expressed Lenin’s “greater 
nationalism” by promoting Spain’s importance, the PNP expresses “greater nationalism” 
when it supports the United States and statehood for Puerto Rico. Still, the PNP’s 
position is very nuanced, and while it promotes “greater nationalism,” it also promotes 
“narrow nationalism,” as a Puerto Rican U.S. state would still exercise some form of 
autonomy under the U.S. federal system. By advocating for autonomy within the United 
States’ Federal Government, the PNP is tacitly arguing that Puerto Rico is a distinct 
nation from the United States, though not so distinct as to stifle the incorporation of the 
island into the “greater nation” of the United States.24 
 Each of the current major political parties in Puerto Rico could be considered 
elites according to Paul R. Brass’ elite competition theory of nationalism. In viewing the 
parties themselves as elites, both of Brass’ explicit conceptualizations of competition can 
be seen in Puerto Rico. First, elite competition exists within each political party in Puerto 
Rico, as each party, in the process of electoral politics, must support various candidates to 
act as representatives of their party. Perhaps the best example of intra-party elite 
competition is demonstrated by the PPD. This party advocates for a commonwealth 
compact of permanent union between Puerto Rico and the U.S. While the actual, legal 
status has not changed greatly since the Commonwealth Constitution was ratified by 
                                                 
23
 The PPD is considered a “big tent” political party, and thus includes many different factions who propose 
very different visions of autonomy, including but not limited to the current Commonwealth government. 
24
 The PNP has explicitly stated that Puerto Rico is a fundamentally distinct nation from the U.S. and 
promotes the continuation of this difference even after incorporation of Puerto Rico as a new state of the 
union by allowing Puerto Rico to compete in international events like the Olympics separate from the U.S. 
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Puerto Ricans and Congress in popular votes in 1952, different party presidents have 
promoted alternate visions of the Puerto Rican Commonwealth. Most notably, upon 
reelection in 1988 PPD governor Rafael Hernández Colon explicitly stated his desire to 
revisit the status debate via a plebiscite. While the plebiscite did not take place under his 
leadership,25 he articulated a vision for a commonwealth status distinct from the one 
under which he governed. Specifically, he promoted binding permanent union with the 
United States that could be altered only by mutual agreement. Colon’s vision for a new 
commonwealth status was defeated in the 1992 elections and elites within the PPD 
competed for a new leader to define a new vision for commonwealth status. Eventually 
this role was filled by Sila Calderón, who won the governorship for the PPD in 2000 after 
eight years of a PNP led government. 
 The inter-party electoral politics between the three major parties of Puerto Rico 
constitutes Brass’ second conceptualization of elite competition. In seemingly benign 
fashion, each electoral contest held on the island is a competition to redefine the Puerto 
Rican nation. Because each party is founded on its preference for a particular political 
status formulation, each election is an institutionalized contest between competing 
visions of Puerto Rico as a nation. 
 While Blaut’s modern Marxist theory of nationalism does not relate to the inter-
party electoral contests on the island, his revision of Lenin’s “narrow” and “greater 
nationalisms” inform Puerto Rico’s social location. Situated in a veritable sea between 
the world’s only superpower and a loose coalition of nation-states that occasionally agree 
                                                 
25
 The first free and fair plebiscite on status in Puerto Rico was held under PNP Governor Pedro Roselló in 
November, 1993. Though a plebiscite on status was held in Puerto Rico in 1967, it is inaccurate due to U.S. 
and Puerto Rican government interference, including voter suppression as discussed in Chapter 1. 
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to call themselves Latin America, those who inhabit the island occupy a problematic 
geography. Currently, that location is viewed as an intermediate ground between 
arguably two different “greater nationalities” that are comprised of various “narrow 
nationalities.” The two greater nationalities of the Western Hemisphere, generally 
characterized as an affluent, greater Western-U.S. American nationality and a lesser-
developed, greater Latin American nationality, converge and create conflict in Puerto 
Rico. The physical location of Puerto Rico in the Caribbean Sea is a starting point to 
begin to explain the historical importance that the island has held for the two 
civilizations, while the current social location of Puerto Rico in the cultural periphery of 
both Latin America and the “Western” United States of America demonstrates the 
fluidity and flexibility of nationalisms in the country.  
 As the status debate highlights, “Puerto Rican-ness” is distinct from both greater 
U.S. American and greater Latin American nationalities, but both are invoked in the 
debate to define what is “Puerto Rican.” These two greater nationalities are brought to 
light through language and economic status of Puerto Rico. Despite nearly 100 years of 
U.S. American influence, Puerto Ricans are a Spanish speaking people. As such, Puerto 
Ricans are innately connected to the greater Latin American nationality, which is created 
in part by the relatively common Spanish language26 and the historical bond many narrow 
nationalities within Latin America share as former Spanish colonies. However, Puerto 
Rico’s bond with the greater Latin American nationality is complicated by Puerto Rico’s 
                                                 
26
 Though most countries within Latin America recognize Spanish as their national language, some 
countries have accepted various indigenous languages as official languages as well. Furthermore, some 
Latin American countries have few ties to Spain, but strong historical roots in Portugal. Connections to 
Portugal or Spain have traditionally constituted general acceptance as a “member” of Latin America. 
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economic status. Though Puerto Rico’s GDP is far below that of the poorest state in the 
United States, it is much larger than the GDP of any Latin American nation.27 This 
economic disparity situates Puerto Rico in between both greater nationalities of the 
Western Hemisphere and further distinguishes Puerto Rico as a unique narrow 
nationality. 
 Most importantly, a unique Puerto Rican nationality is promoted by everyone on 
the island, regardless of political party and status preference. As demonstrated by both 
the popular culture and the continued political status debate on the island, Puerto Ricans 
are constantly presented with symbols of nationalism. These various symbols of 
nationalism represent the Puerto Rican nation as a socially constructed entity, and thus 
support Paul R. Brass’ instrumentalist theory of nationalism. However, social 
constructions of primordial characteristics are used to define “Puerto Rican-ness.” The 
use of primordialism contrasts with Brass’ elite competition theory of nationalism that 
emphasizes only elite competition to define a nation and the symbols that represent it. 
Still, Brass’ elite competition theory was validated by both the intra-party elite 
competition within the three main political parties in Puerto Rico and the inter-party 
electoral competitions. Both forms of elite competition explicitly organize distinct visions 
of the nation of Puerto Rico that are promoted by elites within the parties and against one 
another, in order to win the support of the populace. 
                                                 
27
 CIA World Factbook.  U.S. Census Bureau, (2007) www.census.gov and U.S. Department of Commerce 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, (2007) www.bea.gov. Puerto Rico’s estimated per capita GDP in 2005 was 
$18,700, while Argentina’s was $13,700, Brazil’s was $8,300, Chile’s was $11,900, and Venezuela’s was 
$6,300 (as estimated for all countries for 2005). Mississippi’s estimated Gross State Product per capita in 
2005 was $27,545.  
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 However, the question of Puerto Rican nationality is unlike the flag debate. The 
color of blue in the Puerto Rican national flag acted as a symbol for each individual’s 
preferred political status, and thus, preferred vision of the Puerto Rican nation. But, the 
question of Puerto Rican nationality cannot be answered by an edict of the Puerto Rican 
Department of State. Elite competition may be able to mediate and control the debate 
regarding Puerto Rican national symbols, as it did in 1995 by decreeing that both the “sky 
blue” and “navy blue” variants of the flag may be used officially to represent the Puerto 
Rican nation. However, the answer to the larger question of what is the Puerto Rican 
nation and who belongs to it lies within each individual’s interpretation of the socially 
constructed and continuously contested nation of Puerto Rico. 
 The nationalist framework offers an important perspective on the larger status 
debate. Yet, previous scholarship emphasizing Puerto Rican nationalisms has failed to 
recognize the importance of nationalisms in statehood and commonwealth status. 
However, even when the nationalist framework is applied to commonwealth and 
statehood status, nationalism does not provide a holistic framework to analyze the status 
debate. The nationalist framework resembles the economic framework by emphasizing 
individual interpretations. In the next chapter, I offer a new framework that structures 
individual interpretations of Puerto Rican nationality into the status preferences 
articulated in the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Morality of Status 
 
 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that Puerto Rico “occupies a 
relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our history.”1 The island’s 
political status remains ambiguous in spite of economic and ideological arguments which 
beckon a solution to the century-old status debate. The U.S. government officially 
recognizes Puerto Rico as an “organized, unincorporated territory.” The meaning of this 
seemingly benign, if not logically suspect phrase raises concern on the island and in 
Washington, D.C. Puerto Rico is not a state of the United States and is not a sovereign 
country, leaving the island’s commonwealth government to flounder in uncharted 
territory with regard to political status. Two plebiscites were held in 1993 and 1998 to 
allow residents to choose their preferred status. In 1993, a plurality of voters supported 
commonwealth status, while the 1998 plebiscite resulted in a majority of voters favoring 
                                                 
1 Examining Board v. Flores 426 U.S. 572 (1976) quoted in Trías Monge. 191. 
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“None of the above.” Pundits argue that the 1998 outcome further perpetuated Puerto 
Rico’s ambiguous status, fueling questions about the meaning of “None of the above.”  
In this chapter I interpret “None of the above” via economic, ideological and 
moral frameworks to rationalize the 1998 outcome in the context of the century-long 
status debate. I analyze “None of the above” with moral metaphors extrapolated from 
George Lakoff’s Moral Politics. However, as a foundation for the morality of status, I 
evaluate the frameworks discussed in the previous two chapters which emphasize an 
economic, cost-benefit analysis and an ideological interpretation of nationalism in the 
status debate. I have argued that these two frameworks are often isolated from each other 
by scholars and other interested parties in the status debate (like the U.S. Congress). As 
isolated concepts, neither lens can properly frame the realities of the Puerto Rican 
political status debate. I argue that a moral framework accommodates both economic and 
ideological interpretations of the debate. I demonstrate that Puerto Ricans, like residents 
of the United States, view political issues through a moral framework, as articulated by 
George Lakoff. Buried deep within that moral framework, I argue that political status 
should be interpreted through a metaphor of “family composition.” 
 
The Economics and Ideologies of Status 
An economic framework greatly influences the status debate. Advocates of 
statehood and commonwealth have argued that their preference is in the best financial 
interests of those who reside on the island; economic self-interest was one of the main 
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tenants of both the PNP2 and PPD’s3 respective plebiscitary campaigns in 1993 and 1998. 
However, the campaigns for statehood stressed the notion that Puerto Ricans would 
receive large amounts of new funding if the island were to become a U.S. state. This 
campaign promise was reinforced by Congressional hearings regarding Puerto Rican 
status held between 1989 and 1991. However, the plebiscites held in 1993 and 1998 both 
resulted in a minority of Puerto Rican voters favoring statehood (albeit a large minority). 
Statehood does not have a mandate from the Puerto Rican populace even though many 
commentators believe, and the PNP has promoted for years, that statehood would bring 
everyday Puerto Ricans prosperity by strengthening ties with the U.S. 
The economic argument has never garnered enough support to acquire a majority 
vote in Puerto Rican history. Still, the popularity of statehood nearly equals that of 
commonwealth status according to the 1993 plebiscite. Despite such popularity, 
statehood advocates have had trouble deflating the argument that statehood would require 
assimilation with the U.S., and the loss of their distinct “Puerto Rican” identity. The PNP 
attempted to counteract this sentiment when Governor Roselló touted “jíbaro 
statehood.”4 This vision of statehood invoked the national symbol of Puerto Rico as 
peasant laborer, and alleged that a distinct island state with a robust culture could fit into 
the U.S. federal system. Residents were unconvinced. 
Some might argue that residents were convinced that commonwealth status best 
supported their economic interests. Thus, the economic framework could validate the 
                                                 
2
 PNP is the acronym for the Partido Nuevo Progresista, the pro-statehood party of Puerto Rico.  
3
 PPD is the acronym for the Partido Popular Democratico, the pro-commonwealth party of Puerto Rico. 
For further explanation of the dominant political parties in Puerto Rico, see Chapter 1 
4
 “Jíbaro statehood” is discussed in Chapter 1. 
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slight plurality that commonwealth received in 1993. Though possible, an economic 
interpretation emphasizing commonwealth status is both unusual and offers no 
explanation why Puerto Ricans changed their mind so drastically five years later. In 
1998, when 50.3 percent of voters cast ballots for “None of the above,” not much had 
changed. Certainly, new political winds had blown in and out of Puerto Rico over the 
years, including the powerful Hurricane Georges just three months before the second 
plebiscite. Still, the outcome came as a surprise to many. The Puerto Rican Supreme 
Court mandated that “None of the above” offer no economic policy; it was put on the 
ballot as an officially sanctioned form of free speech and then promoted by the PPD. 
Some could misconstrue voters’ actions in 1993 as a basic, rational decision based on 
their interpretations of the pervasive economic argument surrounding status. However, 
this hypothesis fails to inform the 1998 decision, as “None of the above” did not offer an 
economic alternative. 
Where the economic interpretation fell flat, other theorists emphasize the 
importance of various ideologies to shape the political atmosphere in Puerto Rico. Most 
importantly, nationalism has been interpreted as the ideological compass that guides 
Puerto Rican politics. Many scholars of nationalism focus on various independence 
movements as the only valid options for Puerto Ricans to express nationalist sentiments. 
The PPD and other commonwealth supporters believe a distinct Puerto Rican nation 
thrives under commonwealth status.5 The nationalist argument offers an easy explanation 
                                                 
5
 For further description of ideological nationalisms specifically highlighting the nationalisms of 
commonwealth and statehood in Puerto Rico, see Chapter 3. 
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of the 1993 plebiscite results: slightly more residents believed that commonwealth better 
represented the Puerto Rican nation than would statehood. 
However, the ideology of nationalism does not explain the dramatic deviation 
from standard voting patterns presented by the 1998 plebiscite. “None of the above” 
offered no new vision of a Puerto Rican nation; it offered no vision at all! The enabling 
law for the plebiscite, as well as the Supreme Court order to revise that law, mandated 
that no political party could advocate for “None of the above” with government funding.6 
Though the PPD had a limited campaign in favor of the fifth column, it had no official 
description, merely the title “None of the above.”7 This option gave no description of a 
political status, much less a vision of Puerto Rican nationalism. Thus, the two primary 
theories scholars have used to define Puerto Rican politics cannot account for the 
outcome of the 1998 plebiscite on status. 
 
Other Interpretations of Status 
A cacophony of lesser-recognized theories, both rational and irrational, could be 
used to interpret the seemingly strange outcome of the 1998 plebiscite. Are Puerto Ricans 
apathetic and cynical, disinterested in status, or—as the U.S. government once 
believed—unfit to self-govern? Many politicians and politicos discuss an increase in 
cynicism in the electorate.8 This claim is somewhat substantiated by a decrease in overall 
                                                 
6
 Álvarez Rivera, interview by author. and Báez Galib. 
7
 See Appendix 1.2 for the 1998 ballot descriptions of the status options. 
8
 Álvarez Rivera, interview by author. and Báez Galib. and de Lourdes Santiago Negrón. and Hernández. 
interview by author.  
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voter turnout from the 1993 plebiscite to the one held in 1998.9 However, it would be 
disingenuous to argue that Puerto Ricans have lost their appetite for politics and 
government. Turnout for the 1998 plebiscite was depressed due to Hurricane Georges. 
Furthermore, Puerto Ricans face more restrictive voting laws, cannot vote in federal 
elections, and still vote more frequently than residents of any other state in the union.10 
While both voter registration and voter turnout was lower for plebiscites than for general 
elections, voter turnout for the two plebiscites resembled the high turnout in the United 
States during the 2000 presidential election.11 Likewise, Puerto Ricans interpret each vote 
they cast in general elections, especially those for governor, as de facto votes for their 
status preference.12 Lastly, Puerto Rico has been largely self-governed for the last 50 
years, after centuries of both strict and the more recent, relatively relaxed colonial rule. 
Arguments that Puerto Ricans are somehow inherently unfit for self-government have 
long been discounted as racist rants of ignorance. 
A cursory explanation why “None of the above” garnered over 50 percent of the 
vote has been introduced by commonwealth and independence advocates alike. 
Adherents of both groups argue that in 1998, some independence advocates and most 
commonwealth supporters cast their ballots for “None of the above” to ensure that 
                                                 
9
 Álvarez Rivera. Elecciones en Puerto Rico. Voter turnout from 1993 to 1998 decreased from 1,700,990 to 
1,566,270 votes cast. When voter registration is also accounted for, the percentage of registered voters who 
voted in 1993 versus 1998 also decreased, from 73.5 percent to 71.3 percent. 
10
 Cámara. 4. 
11
 Begman, Michael. “Registered Voter Turnout Improved in 2000 Presidential Election, Census Bureau 
Reports.” U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce. 27 February 2002. http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/voting/000505.html. Based on U.S. Census data, 2,716,509 Puerto Ricans 
were 18 or older in 2000, which translates 63 percent and 58 percent turnout rates of eligible voters in the 
1993 and 1998 plebiscites (though the actual turnout was likely higher than population data from 2000 
represents). Voter turnout for registered and non-registered citizens in the U.S. in 2000 was 60 percent. 
12
 Cámara. 92. 
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statehood did not win.13 Superficially, this argument is captivating; yet, it is easily refuted 
by the 1993 plebiscite results. Whether advocates of independence voted for one of the 
commonwealth options, or independence, or “None of the above,” makes no difference 
with relation to support for statehood. An additional vote for any of the non-statehood 
options lowers the percentage of votes for statehood. In 1993, the commonwealth and 
independence options combined garnered 53 percent of votes cast. In 1998, the 
commonwealth options combined with independence and “None of the above” received 
53.2 percent of the votes cast. Regardless of which of the four options other than 
statehood was voted for in 1998, statehood would not have acquired a majority. A vote 
for commonwealth, independence, or even a blank or null ballot14 could all be viewed as 
votes against statehood. Independence advocates did not need to for “None of the above” 
to oppose statehood. Rather, something motivated individuals to vote for “None of the 
above.” 
Independence advocate’s alleged votes for “None of the above” further dispel the 
myth that nationalisms alone define the status debate. Regardless of how the votes were 
actually cast, supporters of independence vocally promoted a different option (at least 
retrospectively). As discussed in Chapter 3, “None of the above” offered no vision of the 
Puerto Rican nation, yet independence advocates supported it. Certainly the 
independence column in 1998 represented an independent Puerto Rican nation as it 
described, “The recognition that Puerto Rico is a sovereign republic with full authority 
                                                 
13
 Báez Galib. and Hernández, interview by author. and de Lourdes Santiago Negrón. and Senator Charlie 
Rodriguez Colón, interview by author, tape recording, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 13 June 2006. 
14
 Notably, the percentage of null or blank ballots decreased between 1993 and 1998 from 0.6 percent to 0.3 
percent, a real decrease of 5,902 votes.  
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over its territory and in its international relations…”15 Likewise, the PIP campaigned in 
favor of the independence column in the 1998 plebiscite. The PIP did not openly support 
“None of the above” or an allegiance commonwealth advocates. Rather, individual 
independence advocates disregarded their political party and nationalist framework to 
vote for “None of the above.” 
 Perhaps a statistical analysis, followed by a well implemented survey of voter 
choice from 1993 to 1998, could be able to validate the theory that independence 
advocates played the role of “swing voters” supporting “None of the above” in the 1998 
plebiscite. Years of sometimes violent opposition demonstrate independence advocates’ 
desire to neutralize the possibility of statehood. Still, the independence advocate as swing 
voter hypothesis offers no insight into why independence voters would oppose statehood 
under the banner of “None of the above” in place of independence.  
A more compelling argument specific to the 1998 plebiscite alleges that statehood 
advocates created two commonwealth options to split the support for commonwealth.16 
The 1993 plebiscite demonstrated the popularity of some form of commonwealth, which 
could be considered a voting bloc. The hypothesis claims that two definitions of 
commonwealth (columns 1 and 2)17 would divide the commonwealth voting bloc and 
statehood would emerge as the most popular option by a large margin. 
Still, a split of the commonwealth voting bloc would not, by itself, create a 
majority vote in favor of statehood. Just as independence advocates could have voted for 
independence, commonwealth or “None of the above” to oppose statehood, 
                                                 
15
 See Appendix 1.2, Column 4 
16
 Báez Galib. 
17
 See Appendix 1.2 
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commonwealth supporters would still oppose statehood with either option. Likewise, the 
two commonwealth options reflect a real division within the PPD party over the future of 
commonwealth status.18 However, it is possible that an evenly divided commonwealth 
voting bloc contrasted with a united statehood voting bloc could have been construed as a 
mandate for Puerto Rican statehood. This is not beyond the realm of possibility in Puerto 
Rico. After the 1998 plebiscite, PNP Governor Roselló’s administration said that 
statehood had won with over 90 percent. The Roselló administration arrived at this 
conclusion by counting “None of the above” as an invalid option. Thus, they argued, that 
of the viable status options presented in 1998, statehood was approved by over 90 
percent. Just as the Puerto Rican Supreme Court mandated that “None of the above” be 
placed on the ballot, they obliged the Roselló administration to publish the plebiscite 
results including “None of the above.”19   
The hypothesis that statehood advocates simply wanted to divide the 
commonwealth voting bloc in 1998 is both compelling and logical. This hypothesis 
deserves further study. However, my research does not focus on the commonwealth 
voting bloc in 1998, as this argument would apply only to the 1998 plebiscite.  
The mere assertion of this theory accurately reflects the voracious emotion 
embedded deep within the status debate. My interests lie in the deeper meaning of status, 
which evokes such strong emotions. I argue that the deeper meaning of status can be seen 
through a holistic analysis of the two plebiscites held in the 1990s. The two predominant 
theories used to describe Puerto Rican politics (economic self-interest and ideological 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter 3 for a synopsis of the internal divisions within the pro-commonwealth PPD party. 
19
 Báez Galib. and Alvarez Rivera, interview by author. 
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nationalisms) have each failed to offer a unifying theory to characterize the results of 
both plebiscites. Likewise, Puerto Ricans remain interested in island politics and political 
status. Thus, a new theoretical framework must be found to fully accommodate the 
nuance of the plebiscite results in the context of the greater status debate. For this 
purpose, I now turn to George Lakoff’s Moral Politics. 
 
Moral Politics 
 Puerto Rican status politics can best be viewed through the framework of moral 
politics, as the theory offers a well formulated foundation from which a holistic 
hypothesis to inform voting in the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites can be extrapolated. In this 
section I contextualize Lakoff’s work within U.S. and Puerto Rican societies to 
demonstrate the similarities between the two political climates in the 1990s. I then 
recount the pertinent aspects of his theory as a foundation to interpret one of Lakoff’s 
fundamental metaphors (the “nation as family” metaphor) and apply it to Puerto Rican 
status politics. 
Cognitive linguist George Lakoff, in his innovative 1996 work Moral Politics,20 
describes a situation surprisingly similar to the political divide in Puerto Rico. Lakoff 
offered Moral Politics as his interpretation of, and hope for the political landscape after 
Democrats in the United States received a crushing defeat in the 1994 general elections. 
According to Lakoff, Republicans, led by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, took 
control of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate based on their fluid 
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 Lakoff, George. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. 2nd Edition. Chicago, Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
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utilization of morality in politics. The use of “moral issues” and moral discourse was also 
exemplified in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, which highlighted “morally 
divisive” issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Lakoff believes this framing of 
politics often casts Republicans as moral and Democrats as immoral. Throughout his 
work he argues that liberals, like their more conservative brethren, utilize a framework of 
morality to craft political positions. Democrats and liberals have a systematic view of 
morality, but they often fail to articulate the morality of their positions. According to 
Moral Politics, both liberal and conservative formulations of morality are based on 
conceptual metaphors. 
The foundational argument in Moral Politics frames the primary political division 
in the United States not as liberal-versus-conservative, but rather as the difference 
between two moral visions of the world. In order to define what is and is not “moral,” 
Lakoff believes liberals and conservatives use the “metamoral” concept of “Moral 
Accounting.” It is metamoral, because the metaphor of moral accounting does not itself 
“tell you exactly which actions are moral or immoral.”21 The moral accounting metaphor 
frames every topic in economics by creating a moral “account” of well-being, similar to a 
checking account that can be withdrawn from and replenished. This moral account 
translates the qualitative concept of well-being into a quantifiable system of relative 
increases and decreases. Though Lakoff doesn’t offer a unit of analysis to quantify well-
being, the metamoral concept makes sense of financial terminology commonly used in 
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non-economic situations such as “to owe a favor,” or to be “worth it.” The moral 
accounting metaphor frames otherwise non-economic issues in a cost-benefit dichotomy.  
Likewise, moral accounting is metamoral because it is pre-moral. Individuals rely 
on moral accounting as the foundation for a moral hierarchy. Lakoff argues that just 
individuals organize, or “balance,” their moral account using various different theories. 
He describes the concepts of “work as exchange or reward,” “reward and punishment,” 
“absolute goodness versus retribution” and a myriad of other ways to conceptualize 
distribution and redistribution of well-being. These concepts build upon the foundation of 
moral accounting. 
All of these disparate concepts that could be used to balance the moral account are 
organized by family structure. Specifically, Lakoff identifies two dominant family 
structures in the United States that organize the moral account: the “strict father family” 
and the “nurturant parent family.” Each family structure emphasizes one concept to 
organize the moral account. This emphasis creates morality. Thus, Lakoff identifies strict 
father morality and nurturant parent morality as those moralities which reflect strict father 
and nurturant parent families. 
With a foundation in moral accounting, the two moral frameworks are applied to 
politics in the United States via the metaphor of “nation as family.” This metaphor holds 
that the nation is a family, where the government acts as parent and the citizens are 
children. In this metaphor, the politics of a nation are the interactions between 
government and citizen, parent and child. Focusing on the most basic elements of his 
argument, moral politics is a hierarchy of metaphors that dictate what is right and wrong. 
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Figure 4.1   An Outline of Lakoff’s Moral Framework22 
 
Using this hierarchy of metaphors, political actions become moral or immoral depending 
upon the family structure that defines which metaphor to distribute well-being is most 
appropriate (step III). Thus, Lakoff argues that strict father and nurturant parent 
moralities frame every aspect of politics in the United States.  
 
The Morality of Status 
 “The people are advocates of independence, or statehood, or commonwealth 
basically from a moral conviction.”23 The status debate lays the foundation for and 
invigorates with emotion every aspect of Puerto Rican politics. “It is said that everything 
in Puerto Rico revolves around the status problem: the way people evaluate their leaders, 
                                                 
22
 Lakoff. 44-64 and 154. (my synopsis) 
23
 de Lourdes Santiago Negrón. 
I. Well-being is quantifiable via the Moral Accounting metaphor 
II. The Moral Account ought to be balanced, and can be by implementing various 
metaphors to distribute and redistribute well-being, including: 
a. Metaphor of work/employment as one of the following: 
i. A system of even exchange between employer and worker 
ii. A hierarchical system where employer has the power to reward an 
employee 
b. Metaphor of Reward and Punishment 
i. Good actions should be rewarded, adding to one’s moral account 
ii. Bad actions should be punished, subtracting from the account 
c. Metaphor of Absolute Goodness, which states that regardless of the action, 
it is always unjust to willfully subtract from your own, or another’s moral 
account 
d. Metaphor of Retribution, which states that good actions should be 
rewarded and bad actions should be subtracted from the actor’s account, 
even if that means inflicting harm upon him or her 
III. Family Structure dictates which theories of distribution and redistribution are 
important, thus defining what kind of actions are just or morally correct 
IV. The Nation is a Family in which government is a parent and citizens are children 
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their party affiliation, and their preferred solutions to the nation’s problems.”24 Likewise, 
politicians from each political party agree that status is an emotional issue that incites 
passion and emotion.25 Prominent politico Manuel Alvarez Rivera characterizes the status 
debate as a “war of attrition” between “fanatics, who see what they want to see.”26 The 
characterization of the debate as a war illustrates the strong emotions evoked by status 
and reinforces the emphasis politicians have placed on personal emotions when Puerto 
Ricans vote in plebiscites on status. 
 While scholars of Puerto Rican politics have highlighted both economics and 
ideology to define the status debate, they have not incorporated the two in a unified 
theory and further, have not adequately incorporated the intense emotions of Puerto 
Ricans in a holistic analysis of political status. George Lakoff’s theory of moral politics 
unites the economic and ideological frameworks and gives proper weight to the passions 
that inform personal political preferences. Just as politics in the United States are 
simultaneously based on interpretations of moral accounting and family structure, Puerto 
Rican status is based simultaneously on different interpretations of economics and 
ideological nationalisms. Framed in moral politics, the cost-benefit analysis of Puerto 
Rican economics quantifies the relative change in well-being residents would encounter 
based on a change in status. Similarly, ideological discussions of nationalism are recast as 
questions about family composition. Within the framework of morality, emotions inform 
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 Cámara. 5. 
25
 de Lourdes Santiago. and Rodríguez. and Báez Galib. PIP Senator de Lourdes Santiago believes that 
people don’t vote “as a result of a cold, objective analysis.” PNP Senator Rodriguez simply states, “status is 
emotional.” PPD Senator Baez Galib says, “people don’t analyze the formulas, (they are) emotionally 
attached.”  
26
 Alvarez Rivera, interview by author. 
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both an economic cost-benefit analysis and an interpretation of ideological nationalisms 
that combine to specify an individual’s status preference. Moral politics, which 
emphasizes the organization of family, offers a unique framework through which to view 
a coherent politics of Puerto Rican status. However, before delving into the morality of 
Puerto Rican political status, it is necessary to examine whether U.S. moral politics can 
translate to the Puerto Rican status debate. 
 
Translating the “Nation as Family” Metaphor into Puerto Rican 
The “nation as family” metaphor begs the obvious question: Where and what is 
the Puerto Rican nation (if it is indeed a nation)? However, this set of questions is not the 
entirety of the Puerto Rican status question. Nor is it the underlying theme behind status. 
Rather, defining the Puerto Rican nation is foundational to discuss and apply the nation 
as family metaphor to Puerto Rico. 
Consensus regarding the Puerto Rican nation has been reached by major scholars 
and politicos: Puerto Rico constitutes a nation unto itself. It fits the criteria laid out by 
most scholars for nationhood. As discussed in Chapter 3, Puerto Ricans living on the 
island generally believe they share: 
• a common descent or history 
• a common language (Spanish, though English is an official language) 
• a common economy (even if highly dependent on the U.S.) 
• a claim to a geographic territory 
• a founding myth (similar to the common descent and history, while Puerto Ricans 
may still be creating and contesting the “official” founding myth, the Grito de 
Lares, Luis Muñoz Marín, and the indigenous Taínos are all celebrated as 
authentic roots of Puerto Rico) 
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• a common cultural identification (Perhaps the most important of all, Puerto 
Ricans call themselves Puerto Ricans. In keeping with a socially constructed 
theory of nationalism and Benedict Arnold’s “Imagined Communities,” Puerto 
Ricans identify themselves as “Puerto Rican”) 
 
However, Puerto Rico does not perfectly conform to the ideal conception of a nation due 
to the island’s ambiguous national sovereignty. Though the question of national 
sovereignty is particularly important for some nationalism scholars, most Puerto Ricans 
do not support complete sovereignty for the island. James Blaut and other nationalism 
scholars solve this problem by focusing on the simple aspects of the question of 
sovereignty; they focus on various independence movements. However, the vast majority 
of Puerto Ricans do not support independence, as demonstrated in the plebiscites and 
general elections. While a holistic investigation should recognize independence, the 
exclusive study of Puerto Ricans nationalisms via independence advocates is 
inappropriate. 
 To my knowledge, no scholar has analyzed either commonwealth or statehood 
from a nationalist perspective. In Chapter 3, I initiate such a study and conclude that 
nationalisms affect and influence both status options and their respective parties (the PPD 
and the PNP). But nationalisms alone cannot make sense of the status question. It would 
be interesting and informative to analyze both options through the lens of nationalism 
described by Vladimir Lenin. Lenin describes both “Great Nation” and “Narrow Nation” 
typologies of nationalism. This theory could posit Puerto Rico as one part of a Great 
Nation (the U.S.), while still retaining its Narrow Nation status (as Puerto Ricans) under 
statehood and commonwealth. A simultaneous Great-and-Narrow Nation interpretation 
would likely be highly contested. Commonwealth and independence advocates question 
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whether Puerto Rico could retain its Narrow Nation identity while being an equal part of 
the Great Nation. This important question is debated in Puerto Rico without explicitly 
citing Lenin’s theory. Notably, the PPD affirms the validity of this question with regard 
to statehood, yet denies the question with respect to commonwealth status. As expected, 
commonwealth advocates argue that the national identity present under commonwealth 
would be lost under statehood. 
Andrés Sánchez Tarniella explicitly rejects the notion that identity is connected to 
status when he argues that “status” is a myth. He believes that even talk of “status” puts 
the question in political, legal, and juridical spheres and ignores social reality.  He 
concludes by stating that Puerto Rico does have a distinct “national culture” regardless of 
status, and furthermore, that there is not and need not be any relation between citizenship 
and nationality.27 Sánchez Tarniella creatively interprets the status question and his 
analysis appropriately responds to the existence of a national culture. However, he 
unfairly discounts the importance of the political, legal and juridical spheres, denying 
each sphere’s profound impact on the social realities of Puerto Rico.28 
Likewise, it is interesting to question the location of the Puerto Rican nation, and 
the importance of the Puerto Rican diaspora. Yet, the status question has long focused on 
the islands under Puerto Rican jurisdiction.29 Puerto Ricans residing in New York voted 
in a local plebiscite on status, which had little effect on the island. Puerto Ricans who live 
                                                 
27
 Sánchez Tarniella, Andrés. El mito del status: un nuevo oscurantismo. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Ediciones 
Bayoán, 2000. 80-83 
28
 Political Status affects tax policy, federal benefits including personal and corporate welfare, the official 
language of government and schooling, and much more. For further explanation of the import of political 
status, see Chapter 1 
29
 Puerto Rican jurisdiction includes Puerto Rico, Culebra, Vieques and Isla Mona. 
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in the U.S. enjoy the same rights and responsibilities as any other U.S. citizen. Only 
permanent residents of Puerto Rico are treated differently. Scholars do not question that 
Puerto Rico culturally comprises a nation, and politicians only do so as a strategic battle 
of semantics. Former Governor Pedro Roselló (PNP) said in 1995 that Puerto Rico “is not 
and had never been a nation.”30 His contention is tenuous. As governor from 1993-2001, 
Roselló presided over the PNP and acted as the spokesman for the statehood campaign in 
the two plebiscites. During this time he often envisioned Puerto Rico as a jíbaro state, 
thus identifying Puerto Rican statehood with a national symbol and character that would 
transcend political status.31 
 The nation as family metaphor envisions government as a parent and citizens as 
children.32 The implementation of ideology can be viewed in the interaction between 
parent and child, between government and citizen. In Moral Politics, Lakoff focuses on 
specific policies and issues, including abortion, affirmative action, criminal justice, 
economic policies, environmental policies, gay rights, and public education, to name a 
few. However, he does not address which level of government responds to each issue. 
Lakoff does not define how two governments (parents) that govern the same constituency 
(children) interact. The separation of powers in a federal system of government is neither 
taken for granted nor questioned; it is ignored. Lakoff abstractly refers to government as 
a parent who creates and implements public policy. In this way, government becomes one 
monolithic entity, negating the nuance of which level of government creates and 
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 quoted in Martínez, Hector M. “Religious Leaders, Religious Groups and Politics in Puerto Rico.” 
(Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2000).   
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 For further discussion of Roselló’s “estadidad jíbaro” see Chapter 1. 
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 Lakoff. 154. 
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implements which policy. This works when discussing the United States. Although 
contested in specific policies,33 the current federal system in the U.S. is well established 
and is not generally questioned. Furthermore, Lakoff need not make the distinction 
between whether it is a federal, state, or local government that is implementing strict 
father or nurturant parent morality in its policies. In order to validate and justify his 
vision of moral politics, he merely needed to show that some level of government 
implements it. 
 The level of government action is of utmost importance in Puerto Rico. This 
reflects the question of Puerto Rican political status: what should be the relationship 
between the Puerto Rican and federal governments. The question posits the debate 
beyond the various expressions of nationalism evoked by the nation as family metaphor. 
Instead of emphasizing nationalisms, one can emphasize the interaction between and 
composition of the family in the nation as family metaphor. In the next section, I apply 
the nation as family metaphor to the overarching status debate to envision the options 
presented in the 1993 and 1998 plebiscites.  
 
Status as Family Composition 
 Political status invokes much more than just economics or nationalisms when 
framed in the nation as family metaphor, though both aspects are important. Applying the 
framework of moral politics to the status debate envisions status as family composition. 
Following this model, the federal and Puerto Rican governments can be seen as two 
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 Does the No Child Left Behind Act’s implementation overstep the constitutional boundaries that give 
states the right to regulate public education? Does transit funding contingent upon a minimum drinking age 
overstep a state’s right to govern/set policy within its jurisdiction? 
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parents of the Puerto Rican citizenry (the children). This vision of the debate incorporates 
all aspects that influence the various options, including economics, ideology 
(nationalisms), culture, history, and geography by emphasizing these different aspects to 
reconstitute the national family.  
 Each status option provides a different vision of the relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the United States. Under statehood the two governments would be unified in 
one relatively cohesive force, just as Lakoff inadvertently describes the federal system in 
the U.S. Commonwealth advocates have long supported a mutualistic relationship, 
though it is uncertain whether the two governments would, or could, be equal.34 For 
independence advocates, Puerto Rico should only be governed by Puerto Ricans.  
 Extrapolating the family composition metaphor from Lakoff’s concept of nation 
as family, the status question translates as follows: 1) Should Puerto Rico be governed by 
one parent as envisioned in a federal system, in which national, state, and local 
governments abstractly unite in one hierarchically organized structure? 2) Should Puerto 
Rico be governed by two parents in a new system of government, and if so, how should 
those two governments interact? 3) Should Puerto Rico be governed by one parent 
comprised of a Puerto Rican national government and local municipalities acting 
together? In this light, the way different levels of government interact remains the 
entirety of the status debate, but the interpretation of the century-old debate is framed not 
just as an abstract cost-benefit analysis of economics, nor only as an ideological question 
of what is the Puerto Rican nation. The moral politics of status frames the debate as an 
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 García-Passalacqua and Carlos Rivera Lugo. 24. Congresspersons quickly rejected the idea of “mutual 
sovereignty” when it was proposed during the 1989-1991 Congressional hearings on Puerto Rican status. 
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extremely personal question of family composition. Who should, and can, belong to the 
Puerto Rican national family? Who should, and can, belong to the U.S. national family? 
And lastly, are these two national families distinct and can they be combined? 
Given these broad questions, it is worth examining the current commonwealth 
status through the framework of family composition to understand why the plebiscites 
were held in the 1990s, and why status defines nearly every aspect of Puerto Rican 
politics. An interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution as the composition of the 
Puerto Rican national family sheds light on the motivation behind more than fifty years 
of ambiguity in political status. 
Puerto Rico has been governed by a two parent system since the ratification of the 
Commonwealth Constitution in 1952. However, the Puerto Rican and U.S. governments 
have mostly divided the labors of governing; the two parents generally do not compete. 
This division of labor resembles the more traditional relationship between U.S. state and 
federal governments, but important distinctions remain.35 The commonwealth 
government plays no role in deciding foreign policy, yet unlike states, may partake in 
some international competitions (like the Olympics and Miss Universe Pageants). 
Similarly, the commonwealth levies island-wide taxes, but the federal government does 
not impose most federal taxes (including federal income taxes on individuals and 
businesses). Likewise, Puerto Ricans are eligible for most federal benefit programs and 
services (or similar programs crafted specifically for Puerto Rico), yet they receive 
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between 40-60 percent of what residents of a U.S. state would receive.36 Even with this 
level of funding, “the second largest source of revenues [for Puerto Rico’s central and 
municipal governments] is Federal aid, which is 17 percent. This is about 3 percent more 
than the average for the 50 States.”37 At the same time, the federal government retains a 
policy of inattention and inaction with regard to Puerto Rico’s affairs.38  
The federal government could write all public policy on the island under the guise 
of the territory clause and the plenary powers of Congress. However, Congress seldom 
dictates activities in Puerto Rico. Thus, the two parents in the family system governing 
Puerto Rico are separated, where the Puerto Rican government has daily custody over the 
citizens of the island and the federal government pays a significant portion of the bills 
generated by both residents and the Puerto Rican government. Federal payments to the 
government as well as to individuals can be seen as “child support.” Such a reading of 
commonwealth status prompts questions of sustainability. How long should the federal 
government support Puerto Rico and why should it?  
U.S. financial support for Puerto Rico is discussed at length by former Chief 
Justice of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court José Trías Monge. In his 1997 work, he 
emphasizes the importance of mutual benefit both in the creation of the Commonwealth 
Constitution in 1952, and in any other discussion of status with the United States. Trías 
Monge discusses Puerto Rico’s impact on the United States’ economy, military, and 
international standing. For many years U.S. businesses maximized profits in Puerto Rico 
because they could operate nearly tax-free and pay Puerto Ricans low wages. Likewise, 
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 Briefing on Puerto Rico political status by the General Accounting Office (GAO)… 24. 
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Puerto Rico’s strategic importance for the U.S. military was paramount. The island 
housed Roosevelt Roads, the second largest military installation in the Atlantic, which 
was often characterized by military officials as crucial for U.S. national security and 
strategic interests.39 After the 1952 constitution was enacted, the U.S. touted Puerto Rico 
as a success story in decolonization and democratization, attempting to improve its world 
image. 
Puerto Rico’s ability to increase economic opportunities, advance military 
security and provide a talking point for U.S. diplomats greatly benefited the United 
States. The benefits to the island were diluted if not negated by the costs. To offset the 
imbalance, the United States paid residents and the government of Puerto Rico via federal 
programs and subsidies; the status as family composition metaphor envisions these 
payments as child support. The best way to ensure U.S. benefits in Puerto Rico was to 
promote some semblance of Puerto Rican prosperity. The easiest way for the U.S. to 
promote prosperity on the island was via direct and indirect handouts to the Puerto Rican 
government and residents. 
However as early as 1997, Trías Monge argued that the configuration of benefits 
to the United States was vague.40 Thus, he implied that the support given to Puerto Rico 
and its residents may have been unwarranted. Federal transfer payments could be seen as 
punitive if financial support for Puerto Rico does not correlate with benefits received by 
the U.S.. In essence, the U.S. is retroactively paying for arguably 100 years of 
colonialism. Such rhetoric in Puerto Rico, although uncommon with respect to the United 
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States, emerges when discussing Spanish colonialism. Senator Báez Galib of the PPD 
believes he “still has a check to cash from Spain… the balance sheet says, ‘you owe 
me.’”41 While the treatment of Puerto Rico as a colony under Spain versus the U.S. is 
drastically different, Trías Monge reflects on colonialism in Puerto Rico generally: 
Continuation of the present policy of inattention and inaction is the only 
alternative that should be scratched. Such a do-nothing policy will lead to 
further exacerbation of the virulent status debate in Puerto Rico, 
contraction of the center, and possibly polarization and violence. 
Continuation of the present policy will mean that over five hundred years of 
subjection and despair are considered not to be enough, that further 
penance need be done for Puerto Rico to purge whatever sins account for its 
present wretchedness.42 
  
In this statement, Trías Monge describes the current commonwealth status as undue 
penance for past wrongs. However, the U.S. pays to perpetuate Puerto Rico’s ambiguous 
status, currently receives few benefits from it, and exercises little control over the island. 
Its financial support can also be characterized as penance. 
The power structures of the current commonwealth status illustrate a strange family 
portrait via the status as family composition metaphor. The United States becomes a 
negligent, yet financially supportive parent unwilling to relinquish its authority over 
Puerto Rico, its child. In a similar fashion, the commonwealth government has coddled 
this relationship with the U.S., unwilling to allow the residents of Puerto Rico to grow 
into full sovereignty. PPD Senator Báez Galib invokes this metaphoric interpretation as 
he sums up his desire for Puerto Rico to “move out” of the current status.43 Both Trías 
                                                 
41
 Báez Galib. 
42
 Trías Monge. 196. 
43
 Báez Galib. 
  
 
89 
 
 
 
Monge and Senator Báez Galib imply that Puerto Rico has reached the age of majority 
and can fend for itself, further invoking the nation as family metaphor. 
It is within this framework that the 1990s plebiscites were held. Of the eight options 
presented to the public in the two plebiscites, only one explicitly supported the current 
configuration of the two parent system, or status quo. The commonwealth option 
recognized Congressional power over Puerto Rico via the Territorial Clause of the 
Constitution and received less than 0.1 percent of the vote in 1998.44  
Every other option, via the status as family composition metaphor, can be 
interpreted as a petition to drastically change the actions of one or both parents in the 
status relationship. In 1993 and 1998, statehood and independence were presented to 
voters. Statehood would force the federal government to incorporate the Puerto Rican 
government and citizens into a unified federal system. Metaphorically, statehood would 
pressure the U.S. parent to both give Puerto Ricans a vote in the federal government and 
to further include Puerto Ricans in the U.S. national family, while Puerto Ricans would 
agree to live within such a family structure. Conversely, independence would specifically 
pressure the Puerto Rican parent to support itself and its citizens, inferring that residents 
need only live within the Puerto Rican national family. The two plebiscites offered 
different versions of enhanced commonwealth which can be seen as a marriage of the 
U.S. and Puerto Rican governments. Still, both versions specifically pressured the Puerto 
Rican parent to take action. In 1993, the description of commonwealth recognized the 
current status as an unequal relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico and identified 
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four points of contestation that a new commonwealth government would need to rectify 
with the United States. Commonwealth in 1993 represented a new marriage proposal 
between the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments that would closely resemble the 
Commonwealth Constitution of 1952. The proposal to enhance commonwealth in the 
1998 plebiscite drastically changed the terms of union between the U.S. and Puerto Rico. 
The second column of the 1998 plebiscite envisioned Puerto Rico as a sovereign state 
that would immediately sign a compact of permanent union with the United States, 
creating a free association between Puerto Rico and the U.S. The enhancement of 
commonwealth envisions two equal governments in permanent union. 
The status as family composition metaphor simplifies the plebiscitary options. The 
metaphor depicts the current commonwealth status as a failed marriage, which 
necessitates revision of the union, if not nullification. Both statehood and independence 
would nullify the commonwealth marriage and unite the Puerto Rican national family 
under one parent, the U.S. Federal government or a Puerto Rican government, 
respectively. New versions of commonwealth or free association were also offered in the 
plebiscites. Both of which offered new ideas to strengthen the bonds between the two 
parent governments, though both options included significant pre-nuptial agreements that 
would ensure a clear distinction between the U.S. and Puerto Rican national families. In 
1993, the commonwealth option did not recognize the U.S. and Puerto Rican 
governments as equal. The 1998 option of free association attempted to rectify this 
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problem at the expense of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Rican residents.45 However, none of 
these new arrangements of the national family received a majority vote in either 
plebiscite. 
Interpreted with the status as family composition metaphor, “None of the above” is 
a rational answer to a plebiscite which asks citizens to choose the parent with which they 
wish to live. By choosing “None of the above” in lieu of commonwealth, Puerto Ricans 
at once recognized the failure of the 1952 constitution to unify the Puerto Rican and U.S. 
nations into one great national family, while celebrating their connections with both 
narrow national families. Likewise, a majority of voters rejected the domination of one 
side of their family over the other when they rejected independence and statehood, 
however narrowly. Voters soundly renounced the only new, two parent option of free 
association, as it also emphasized one national family over the other by creating a Puerto 
Rican citizenship to replace U.S. citizenship. “None of the above” emphasized the 
importance of both national families and identified the lack of an officially sanctioned 
formulation of family that would give equal weight to both national families. This 
idealistic vision to connect the U.S. and Puerto Rican national families in an equal and 
mutually beneficial relationship was the only option in either plebiscite to receive a 
majority of votes cast. 
Some may argue that Puerto Ricans are not interested in an equal relationship 
between their U.S. and Puerto Rican identities. Countless polls have shown that Puerto 
Ricans identify as “Puerto Rican” over “American” by at least 2 to 1, if not by a greater 
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margin.46 However, the question of “what is Puerto Rican?” is extremely important when 
analyzing an equal relationship between national families. To be “Puerto Rican” is to be a 
pure hybrid, to straddle the line between Latin and North Americas. The Puerto Rican 
national family at once glorifies the poor jíbaro subsistence farmer who eats rice and 
beans, as well as the United States citizenship that allows nearly half of the Puerto Rican 
population to live in the fifty United States. The U.S. is no longer thought of as a melting 
pot but as a salad bowl, in which individual identities remain intact and compliment other 
identities to create a national family; Puerto Rico blends aspects of Latin American and 
North American identities into a distinctly Puerto Rican identity. Still, the Puerto Rican 
national identity is flexibly ambiguous. The color of the national flag was highly 
contested when statehood, commonwealth, and independence advocates used different 
shades of blue to emphasize their preferred status option. The Puerto Rican compromise 
did not mix all of these colors into one acceptable shade of blue. Instead, Puerto Ricans 
officially recognized each shade of blue as an equal representation of the national family. 
Individuals need not pass a Litmus Test before joining others on the street to proudly 
proclaim their Puerto Rican identity. Thus, Puerto Ricans self-identify as Puerto Ricans 
because to be Puerto Rican is to be connected with the U.S. national family. 
In light of the morality of status and the status as family composition metaphor, 
“None of the above” logically and rationally expresses the conundrum of the Puerto 
Rican dilemma. From strictly economic and nationalistic frameworks, “None of the 
above” may seem illogical and imply that Puerto Ricans cannot rationally choose a 
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mutually beneficial status. However, an extrapolation of George Lakoff’s Moral Politics 
illuminates the complexity of the Puerto Rican situation. Economics and nationalism, 
separate or combined, cannot account for the hybrid nature of Puerto Rican-ness. Only by 
recognizing the importance of morality in the Puerto Rican status debate can the gravity 
of the question be fully understood. 
The morality of status offers a reasonable account of why a majority of voters chose 
“None of the above” as their preferred option in 1998. Furthermore, moral politics along 
with the status as family composition metaphor surpasses other lenses of analysis by 
properly framing the status debate. A strictly rational cost-benefit analysis of status 
discounts the importance of nationalism, while a nationalist interpretation of the Puerto 
Rican question does not account for the hybrid status of Puerto Rican-ness. By 
recognizing the importance of morality in political status and framing status as a question 
of family composition, economic and ideological factors can be included, just as the very 
personal and passionate nature of the debate can be understood and celebrated as a 
recognition of the complexity of the situation. Emphasizing the morality of status 
discredits the notion that Puerto Ricans are incapable of making up their minds and 
instead illuminates the nuance of the Puerto Rican question and places that question 
within a moral framework of politics popular in the United States and throughout the 
world. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Conclusion 
 
 
 
The debate over Puerto Rican political status has endured over five centuries, 
survived two military takeovers, two different colonial powers, and most recently, the 
ambiguity of commonwealth status. This ambiguity is both a product of and symbolized 
by Puerto Rico’s geographic location nearly one thousand miles from the continental 
United States. The island occupies a space between the United States and Latin America, 
between colonialism and sovereignty. Current commonwealth status is unacceptable to 
Puerto Ricans. Puerto Rico’s non-voting member of congress recently stated,  
We have an overall consensus in Puerto Rico that our current relation 
with the U.S. is territorial in nature, not fully democratic, not fully 
self-governing, not based on equal rights and duties of citizenship, and 
does not fully implement the principle of government by consent of the 
governed. We have an overall consensus that our current political 
relationship with the United States no longer serves either Puerto Rico 
or the U.S. well.1 
                                                 
1
 Fortuño, Luis. “Opening Remarks.” Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. 3-
22-2007. http://www.house.gov/fortuno/pdf/Legislation/OpeningRmks-03-22-07.html 
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Residents demonstrate their desire for resolution with every vote cast for a local 
representative, senator or governor from one of the three major political parties. In the 
1990s, the Puerto Rican government instituted two plebiscites on status with hopes of 
reaching a consensus. The only majority-gaining option was “None of the above.” In 
1998, a majority of voters rejected statehood, independence, status-quo commonwealth, 
and an enhanced version of commonwealth. Instead, Puerto Ricans chose “None of the 
above,” which offered no definition of status. 
 The Puerto Rican question has often been characterized as an aberration, a 
circumstance “without parallel” in U.S history. Indeed, Puerto Rico’s status is unique. 
However, Puerto Rico is not the only existing U.S. colony. Guam, American Samoa, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and other territories occupy a political 
position similar to Puerto Rico. Still, Puerto Rico’s population dwarfs that of the other 
territories2 and further sets the island apart when discussing the implications of different 
status options. 
 In a global context, Puerto Rico is not a lonely outlier. Comparisons can be made 
between Puerto Rico and other semi-autonomous regions, most notably Hong Kong, 
Tibet, and Taiwan’s relationships with China. When discussing the prospects of 
statehood for Puerto Rico, many opponents have cited secession movements in Quebec, 
the French speaking province of Canada, as well as turmoil in the Basque region of 
Spain. Further comparisons could be extrapolated between Puerto Ricans and the plight 
of ethnic Kurds to create a new nation-state in the Middle East: Kurdistan. Though Puerto 
                                                 
2
 Puerto Rico’s population reported in Census 2000 was 3,808,610. Guam’s population in 2000 was 
154,805. The drastic difference in population would greatly affect each territories’ representation in federal 
government if they were to become states. 
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Rico may stand alone in the United States context, the island’s peculiar status and the 
problems associated with the Puerto Rican question could cast light upon various semi-
autonomous and sovereignty seeking populations throughout the world. The morality of 
Puerto Rican political status provides a first step toward the study of morality with 
respect to other similar situations around the globe. 
 In this thesis, I reorient the status debate from the two dominant paradigms used 
by scholars and politicos to describe Puerto Rican political status. In place of a strictly 
economic or nationalist lens, I contextualize the status debate within a framework of 
morality based on George Lakoff’s Moral Politics. This systematic approach to morality 
emphasizes the metaphor of status as family composition to define the Puerto Rican 
question. The morality of status reframes the debate to account for traditionally rational 
arguments based on economics and ideological nationalisms, as well as the emotive 
aspects of status. 
In order to recognize Puerto Rican political status as a “moral issue,” I have 
drawn from various bodies of literature. In Chapter 2, I recount the economic lens, 
through which many people (including the U.S. Congress) have viewed the status debate. 
In this chapter, I reflect upon the tenuous conclusion reached by two somewhat opposing 
parties: the pro-statehood PNP and the U.S. Congress. Both groups agree that statehood 
would bring more funds to Puerto Rico. With this common understanding of Puerto 
Rican statehood, the groups diverge in action. As the PNP advocated for statehood in the 
1990s, Congress opposed it and began to view the PPD and commonwealth as the “lesser 
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of evils.”3 Still, no one in Puerto Rico campaigns for less federal funding for the island. 
The three political parties, and their respective answers to the status question, all 
advocate for a prosperous Puerto Rican economy closely connected to the U.S. economy. 
The similar economic plank from all three parties and the diverging interpretations of 
what might happen if Puerto Rico’s status were to change, do not support an economic 
interpretation of the debate. Rather the economic framework succumbs to individual 
interpretations that depend upon which politician is believed. Likewise, the status option 
most often promoted by the economic framework, statehood, has been rejected twice by a 
majority of Puerto Rican voters. Furthermore, the interpretation of status as a purely 
economic debate rings hollow to Puerto Ricans who deeply believe in the existence of a 
distinct Puerto Rican culture. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, reflect and expand upon two different theoretical bodies of 
literature to investigate the status debate. Chapter 3 investigates the importance of 
ideological nationalisms in Puerto Rican culture and politics. The chapter recognizes how 
many texts about Puerto Rican nationalisms, including those from James Blaut, Rubén 
Berríos, Edwin Meléndez, Edgardo Meléndez, and others, promote the PIP and other 
independence movements as the only true expressions of Puerto Rican nationalism. These 
scholars stress the importance of absolute sovereignty when applying various theories of 
nationalism to Puerto Rican status. Chapter 3 discredits this acute interpretation as the 
only proper incantation of nationalism. As independence has been soundly rejected in 
both plebiscites on status and in general elections, I examine nationalist expressions from 
                                                 
3
 Colón Morera. Economic Constraints and Political Choices… 438. 
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the PNP and PPD in their respective campaigns for statehood and commonwealth. I argue 
that Puerto Ricans believe in a unique Puerto Rican national identity regardless of 
political persuasion. The PPD and PNP promote a unique Puerto Rican identity within the 
status debate. This is evident after careful analysis of the 1993 plebiscitary campaigns as 
well as in everyday interactions with Puerto Ricans. The importance of nationalist 
sentiment in the statehood and commonwealth campaigns demonstrates one of the 
shortcomings of the traditional nationalist interpretation of the status debate. By 
emphasizing absolute sovereignty as a requirement of nationalist expressions, the 
traditional nationalist interpretation presented by Paul Brass and James Blaut does not 
represent the realities of the Puerto Rican status debate. 
Likewise, the nationalist framework heavily relies upon individual interpretations 
of nationalism. Thus, the power of nationalism (allowing individuals to form their own 
understanding of nationality by employing universal symbols like a flag) also presents 
one of the drawbacks of nationalism as a theoretical framework. The different versions of 
Puerto Rican nationalism promoted by the PIP, PNP, and PPD overly complicate the 
nationalist framework. Thus, no single nationalist analysis can represent the spectrum of 
Puerto Rican sentiment. Similarly, the nationalist framework offers little insight into the 
majority gaining status option in 1998. “None of the above” offered no explicit 
interpretation of nationalism. Ultimately, the nationalist framework fails to adequately 
address the nuances of the two plebiscites within a larger context of the debate. 
To unify individual interpretations of the economic and nationalist lenses, I turn 
to a framework of morality. Chapter 4 utilizes George Lakoff’s Moral Politics as a 
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foundation for the status as family composition metaphor. I translate to Puerto Rican 
politics, Lakoff’s foundational metaphor of the nation as family, where the government is 
parent and citizens are children. However, the nation as family metaphor does not 
function equally in the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Lakoff describes the U.S. national family as 
having one parent, that is to say one government. I emphasize the implicit assumption 
that government is a singular entity to demonstrate the ambiguity of Puerto Rico’s 
political status. Under the current commonwealth status, the Puerto Rican national family 
lives with two parents who do not communicate, two governments that do not cooperate 
to create a prosperous Puerto Rico. This metaphor frames the plebiscites on status and 
Puerto Rican politics generally, to ask Puerto Ricans to decide with which parent they 
wish to live.  
Characterizing the Puerto Rican status debate as a moral issue is not merely an 
intellectual endeavor. Lakoff states, “The point is not just to categorize. Classification in 
itself is relatively boring.”4 Properly situating the academic study of the Puerto Rican 
status debate in moral terms is important because Puerto Ricans view status as a moral 
issue. The status as family composition metaphor offers an alternative vision of the 
debate and more adequately accommodates economic, nationalist, and emotive aspects of 
the Puerto Rican question.  
In 1998, voters chose “None of the above” to express their dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and the lack of an acceptable union between the parents of the U.S. and Puerto 
Rican national families, the governments of Puerto Rico and the United States. “None of 
                                                 
4
 Lakoff. 17. 
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the above” demonstrates current Puerto Rican status to be unacceptable, even though it is 
not an answer to the Puerto Rican question. “None of the above” does not offer a solution 
to the status debate, but it is not an illogical or irrational conclusion to the 1998 
plebiscite. It embodies the desire of most Puerto Ricans to balance in some form of 
union, the Puerto Rican and U.S. governments. 
Many things have changed since December 13th, 1998. The following year saw 
the largest mobilizations ever witnessed on the island.  Puerto Ricans protested U.S. 
military practices in Vieques, Puerto Rico. The massive social mobilizations of hundreds 
of thousands of people in Vieques, Puerto Rico and the U.S. led to the closing of the 
Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in 2003. When announcing the decision to stop military 
practices in Vieques in 2001, President Bush referred to Puerto Ricans. He said, “These 
are our friends and neighbors and they don’t want us there.”5 PPD Senator Báez Galib 
reflected on President Bush’s word choice:  
President Bush did not refer to the Vieques issue as “domestic” or 
“internal to the U.S.” He didn’t refer to “our American citizens in 
Puerto Rico” or our “American friends,” or “our citizens in Puerto 
Rico,” he deliberately chose “friends and neighbors.”6 
 
An emphasis on word choice is indicative of the morality of status and status as family 
composition after the 1998 plebiscite. Senator Báez Galib dwelled on the language, 
because language defines the debate. By characterizing Puerto Ricans as “friends and 
neighbors,” President Bush metaphorically reinforced Senator Báez Galib’s 
                                                 
5
 Snow, Kate and Kelly Wallace. “Bush says Navy will quit bombing Vieques” CNN.com. 14 June 2001. 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/06/14/vieques.halt.04/index.html 
6
 Báez Galib. 
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characterization of Puerto Rico “moving out.”7 The status as family composition 
metaphor illuminates these two phrases as expressions of the national family. Senator 
Báez Galib unites the U.S. and Puerto Rican national families with words like “domestic” 
and “internal,” and an emphasis on shared citizenship, even if the two families should not 
live under the same roof. President Bush, however, rejects the connection between the 
two national families by characterizing the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
as that between friends and neighbors.  
Benedict Anderson’s oft cited work Imagined Communities instructed individuals 
to view nations as socially constructed groups of people united in a common language, 
history, and future. Imagining the Puerto Rican community as one family offers a rich 
illustrative framework to better understand Puerto Rican politics of status. By examining 
Puerto Rican political status through a lens of morality and the metaphor of family 
composition, the debate moves beyond simple cost-benefit analyses and ideological 
struggles to define the nation. The economic cost-benefit analysis and ideological 
nationalisms used to frame the status debate have failed to account for the voracity and 
longevity of the debate on the island, and ultimately have failed to offer an acceptable 
solution to the 109 year old question of political status. 
 The morality of status, and status as family composition models do not, by 
themselves, answer the Puerto Rican question. However, the model offers a fresh vision 
of the century-old debate with the U.S., and may bring new light and new possibilities to 
the table of options spread before Puerto Rico and the United States. There is no doubt 
                                                 
7
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that after five centuries of colonial rule by two different powers, Puerto Rico has come of 
age and must be allowed to fully self-govern. The morality of status proffers that the 
solution to the status question can not be found in choosing one parent over another. 
Rather, Puerto Ricans occupy the unfortunate position of mediator between the 
conflicting U.S. and Puerto Rican parents. While this undertaking gives agency to those 
who pursue it, Puerto Ricans must manage the undesirable task of defining the 
boundaries of the Puerto Rican national family with respect to, and perhaps in spite of the 
island’s historical, economic, nationalist, and moral position with the United States. The 
definition of the Puerto Rican national family poses a great challenge that may take 
another century to overcome. The Puerto Rican status question is but one legacy of the 
families hastily created by 19th and 20th century colonialism, a legacy that continues to 
burden the shared U.S. American and Puerto Rican national family. 
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1993 Plebiscite Options1 
DEFINICIÓN DE 
ESTADIDAD  
 
• Un voto por la Estadidad es un 
mandato para reclamar el 
ingreso de Puerto Rico como 
Estado de la Unión.  
La Estadidad:  
• Es un status no colonial de plena 
dignidad política.  
• Nos permitirá tener los mismos 
derechos, beneficios y 
responsabilidades de los 
cincuenta estados.  
• Es la unión permanente 
garantizada y la oportunidad de 
progreso económico y político.  
• Es la garantía permanente de 
todos los derechos que da la 
Constitución de los Estados 
Unidos de America - incluyendo 
la preservación de nuestra 
cultura.  
 
 
DEFINICIÓN DE 
ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO  
 
Un voto por el Estado Libre Asociado 
es un mandato a favor de:  
• Garantizar el progreso y la 
seguridad nuestra y de nuestros 
hijos dentro de status de plena 
dignidad política, basado en la 
unión permanente entre Puerto 
Rico y los Estados Unidos, 
consagrada en un pacto bilateral 
que no podrá ser alterado sino 
por mutuo consentimiento.  
El Estado Libre Asociado garantiza:  
• Ciudadanía americana 
irrevocable;  
• Mercado común, moneda común 
y defensa común con los Estados 
Unidos;  
• Autonomía fiscal para Puerto 
 
 
DEFINICIÓN DE 
INDEPENDENCIA  
 
La independencia es el derecho de 
nuestro pueblo a mandarse en su 
propia tierra; es el disfrute de todos 
los poderes y atributos de la 
soberanía.  
En el ejercicio de ese derecho inalienable 
e irrenunciable, Puerto Rico se regirá por 
una constitución que establezca un 
gobierno democrático, proteja los 
derechos humanos y afirme nuestra 
nacionalidad e idioma.  
La independencia dará a Puerto Rico los 
poderes que son necesarios para lograr 
mayor desarrollo y prosperidad, 
incluyendo los poderes para proteger y 
estimular nuestra industria, agricultura y 
comercio, controlar la inmigración y 
negociar acuerdos internacionales que 
amplíen mercados y promuevan 
                                                 
1
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• Es la garantía permanente de 
ciudadanía americana, nuestros 
dos idiomas, himnos y banderas.  
• Es la participación completa en 
todos los programas federales.  
• Es el derecho de votar por el 
Presidente de los Estados Unidos 
y elegir no menos de seis 
representantes y dos senadores 
puertorriqueños al Congreso.  
• En el ejercicio de nuestros 
derechos como ciudadanos 
americanos, negociaremos los 
términos de dicha admisión, los 
cuales se someterán al Pueblo de 
Puerto Rico para su ratificación.  
 
Rico;  
• Comité Olímpico puertorriqueño y 
representación deportiva 
internacional propia.  
• Pleno desarrollo de nuestra 
identidad cultural: con el ELA 
somos puertorriqueños primero.  
Desarrollaremos el Estado Libre 
Asociado mediante planteamientos 
específicos al Congreso. De inmediato 
propondremos:  
• Reformular la sección 936, 
asegurando la creación de más y 
mejores empleos;  
• Extender el Seguro Social 
Complementario (SSI) a Puerto 
Rico;  
• Obtener asignaciones del PAN 
iguales a las de los estados;  
• Proteger otros productos de 
nuestra agricultura, además del 
café.  
Todo cambio adicional se someterá 
previamente a la aprobación del pueblo 
de Puerto Rico.  
 
inversiones de otros países.  
Un Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación 
con Estados Unidos y un proceso de 
transición a la independencia acordes con 
la legislación ya aprobada por la Cámara 
y los comités competentes del Senado 
federal dispondrán para: la continuación 
de beneficios adquiridos de Seguro 
Social, veteranos y otros; la ciudadanía 
puertorriqueña y la de Estados Unidos 
para quienes deseen conservarla; el 
derecho a usar moneda propia o el dólar; 
acceso libre al mercado de Estados 
Unidos; incentivos contributivos para la 
inversión norteamericana; aportaciones 
federales por igual cantidad que al 
presente durante al menos una década; y 
la eventual desmilitarización del país.  
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1998 Plebiscite Options1 
PETICION AL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS  
Nosotros, el Pueblo, por la presente y en el ejercicio de nuestro derecho al amparo de la primera enmienda a la Constitución de los Estados Unidos, 
firmemente solicitamos al Congreso de los Estados Unidos, que con toda rapidez deliberada y tras cien años de subordinación política, se defina de 
manera concluyente la condición política del Pueblo de Puerto Rico y el alcance de la soberanía de los Estados Unidos de América, a los fines de 
resolver el actual problema territorial de la isla bajo la siguiente opción: 
1 
   
2 3 4 NINGUNA 
DE LAS 
ANTERIORES 
"La aplicación sobre Puerto 
Rico de la soberanía del 
Congreso, que por virtud de la 
Ley Federal 600 de 3 de julio de 
1950, delega a la Isla la 
conducción de un gobierno 
limitado a asuntos de estricto 
orden local bajo una 
Constitución propia. Dicho 
gobierno local estará sujeto a la 
autoridad del Congreso, la 
Constitución, las leyes y 
tratados de los Estados Unidos. 
Por virtud del Tratado de París y 
la Cláusula territorial de la 
Constitución federal, el 
Congreso puede tratar a Puerto 
Rico en forma distinta a los 
estados, mientras haya una 
base racional. La ciudadanía 
"Un Tratado que reconozca la 
soberanía plena de Puerto Rico 
para desarrollar su relación con 
los Estados Unidos en 
asociación no colonial, no 
territorial. Estados Unidos 
renunciará a todos sus poderes 
sobre Puerto Rico, entrando al 
Tratado en el mismo acto. Puerto 
Rico retendrá todos los poderes 
que no se deleguen 
expresamente a los Estados 
Unidos. Puerto Rico dispondrá 
sobre la ciudadanía 
puertoriqueña. Los ciudadanos 
actuales de los Estados Unidos 
en Puerto Rico retendrán la 
ciudadanía americana, si así lo 
desean, y podrán trasmitirla a 
sus descendientes, sujeto a lo 
"El ingreso de Puerto Rico a la 
Unión de los Estados Unidos de 
América como un estado 
soberano, en completa igualdad 
de derechos, responsabilidades y 
beneficios con los demás estados. 
Reteniendo, además, la soberanía 
de Puerto Rico en aquellos 
asuntos no delegados por la 
Constitución de los Estados 
Unidos al Gobierno Federal. El 
derecho al voto presidencial y la 
representación igual en el Senado 
y proporcional en la Camara de 
Representantes, sin menoscabo 
de la representación de los demás 
estados. Manteniendo también la 
presente Constitución de Puerto 
Rico y las mismas leyes estatales; 
y con ciudadanía americana 
"El reconocimiento de que 
Puerto Rico es una república 
soberana con autoridad plena 
sobre su territorio y en sus 
relaciones internacionales con 
una Constitución que será la 
Ley Suprema que provea para 
un sistema de gobierno 
republicano y la protección de 
los derechos humanos. Los 
residentes de Puerto Rico 
deberán lealtad a, y tendrán la 
ciudadanía y nacionalidad de la 
república de Puerto Rico. El 
haber nacido en Puerto Rico o 
tener parientes con la 
ciudadanía americana 
estatutaria por nacimiento en el 
anterior territorio, dejarán de ser 
fundamento para la ciudadanía 
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 Alvarez Rivera. Elecciones en Puerto Rico. 
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americana de los 
puertorriqueños será estatutaria. 
El inglés continuará siendo el 
idioma oficial de las agencias y 
tribunales del Gobierno Federal 
que operen en Puerto Rico." 
que dispongan las leyes de los 
Estados Unidos o el Tratado. 
Debe entenderse que, a partir de 
la vigencia del Tratado, el solo 
hecho de nacer en Puerto Rico 
no concederá derecho a ser 
ciudadano americano. El Tratado 
a negociarse dispondrá sobre 
asuntos de mercado, defensa, el 
uso del dólar, asistencia 
económica y la protección de 
derechos personales adquiridos. 
El Tratado tambien reconocerá la 
capacidad soberana de Puerto 
Rico para concertar convenios y 
otros tratados internacionales." 
permanente garantizada por la 
Constitución de los Estados 
Unidos de América. Las 
disposiciones de la ley federal 
sobre el uso del idioma inglés en 
las agencias y tribunales del 
gobierno federal en los cincuenta 
estados de la Unión aplicarán 
igualmente en el Estado de Puerto 
Rico, como ocurre en la 
actualidad." 
americana; excepto que las 
personas que tenían la 
ciudadanía americana tendrán 
el derecho estatuario de 
mantener esa ciudadanía de 
por vida, por derecho o 
decisión, según provisto por las 
leyes del Congreso federal. Los 
beneficios de los individuos en 
Puerto Rico, adquiridos por 
servicios o por contribuciones 
hechas a los Estados Unidos, 
serán honrados por los Estados 
Unidos. Puerto Rico y los 
Estados Unidos desarrollarán 
tratados de cooperación, 
incluyendo asistencia 
económica y programatica por 
un período razonable, libre 
comercio y tránsito y el status 
de las fuerzas militares." 
 
COMISION ESTATAL DE ELECCIONES 
PLEBISCITO DEL 13 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1998 
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